ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٢] (٨٩٦/٣٤١)

,, ^ 1S Highness stated that he fully agreed with what I had said, and
tnat as we already knew, his policy is and always has been, to establish
complete control of the Central Government over all territory lying; within
the boundaries of Persia. ^ ^ &
^ following suggestions as regards the methods that
snould be adopted for restoring order in Persian Baluchistan: —
(a) The occupation by Persian troops of the Sarhad, where they
should firmly establish themselves, thus protecting the railway
and driving trouble away from it.
(b) A forward move from the Sarhad to Bampur assisted by another
column from Kerman on Bampur via Bam.
(c) The installation of a capable Governor at Bampur, who will be
responsible for the administration of the whole province
assisted by adequate garrisons at Bampur, Khwash, Duzdap
and other important strategic points.
His Highness replied that his views as to how to tackle the problem
were in complete agreement with the outlined plan I had proposed, and
that the first immediate task is to establish Persian control over the Sarhad
by troops from the Seistan side, and that when these have consolidated their
position and the safety of the railway is guaranteed, then the concentric
advance on Bampur from the Sarhad and Kerman can be undertaken. His
Highness stated that the Persian Government does not desire military
assistance from us in these operations, but cordially welcomes our offer of
close co-operation between the respective local authorities.
I asked the Prime Minister to let me know the names of the responsible
Persian authorities in order that local British officials may be informed,
and I added that I would request the Government of India to nominate a
special liaison officer who has a thorough knowledge and experience.
His Highness asked for any assistance that my Military Attache could
give (who was staff officer of the Sarhad operations during the war), by
close consultation with the Persian General Staff at Tehran. I agreed.
The Prime Minister then asked me to authorize the Military Attache
to make out a detailed plan of operations for the benefit of the persian Staff.
I agreed to this.
His Highness stated that he agreed to the principle of having a
Governor at Bampur for the whole of Persian Baluchistan and that Shaukat-
ui-Mulk had already been appointed to the post.
His Highness promised future co-operation for the prevention of raids
and gun running. As regards the evacuation of British detachments from
the Sarhad, it was agreed that this should be settled by mutual arrange-
pient, but would not take place before the Persian occupation of the Sarhad
had become effective.
The Prime Minister stated that the task of establishing effective control
over the whole province is by no means a light one, and that he considered
it would take three years to complete it.
He intended in this Persian year (ends March 22nd, 1924) to advance
to Khwash from Seistan, and to Rudbar from Kerman, and to establish
advanced bases at both points. He will then send Shaukat-ul-Mulk to
Bampur with a small escort in order to give the tribes a chance of making
their submission peacefully. Next autumn converging columns will move
on Bampur and deal with any rebels, who refuse to submit to the Central
Government. He expressed the view that the whole operation must be
carried out by stages methodically and considers that the tribes cannot
oppose disciplined troops with any success.
His Highness then enquired anxiously whether permission had been
obtained for his aeroplanes and armoured cars to come to Persia via ’Iraq.
I replied that I had again telegraphed to Baghdad for an early reply which
I am still awaiting, and understand that the ’Iraq Government had not
yet given a decision. His Highness stated that the aeroplanes are due at