ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٢] (٨٩٦/٣٨٢)

T"
96
But the organisation of a system of control of so large and difficult an area
is a large and difficult question for the Persian Government. There is, more
over some reason to fear that unless it is approached on correct hues there
will’be inappreciable results from such action as the Persian authorities may
take His Lordship is therefore urging the Government of India to expedite
their replv to the telegram of which a copy was enclosed in my letter of 12th
October and trusts that His Majesty’s Minister may be instructed to endeavour to
■persuade the Persian Government to be guided in respect of the form of control
to be set up by the advice of the experienced officers in British Baluchistan, who
have had occasion to study the question from across the frontier.
Whatever system of administration of Persian Baluchistan may be under
taken by the Persian Government immediate results from it are, as your letter
(Serial No 130) of 24th October indicates, not to be expected, and in the
meantime there is constant danger of further raids into British territory for
which the Persian Government must he held technically responsible. Lord
Peel would therefore suggest for Lord Curzon’s consideration, that Sir
P Loraine as soon as he opens the discussion of the Duzdap railway cum
Persian Baluchistan question, might sound the Persian Prime Minister on the
proposal made by the Government of India that their local officers may be
authorised to take any necessary action against Dost Mohammad Khan and
other turbulent elements in the name of the Persian Government, with the
co-operation of Persian officials and forces if any are immediately available,
or independently if they are not. If ftiza Khan should prove not unwilling
so to regularize the position of the British detachments in Persian Territory
pending their withdrawal to make room for Persian control, details might
perhaps with advantage be left for direct discussion between the Government
of India (or their local authorities) and His Majesty’s Minister.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
The Under Secretary of State,
Poreign Office
PBLCIS.
i>
In their despatch No. 10 [Serial No. 84 of File No. 70(1)M.] of 19th
p.- 4479 — 22 (F. o. reference E.-13285-70-34). October 1922 the Government of India
recommended (paragraph 12) that it
should be put to the Persian Government that if they desired to retain the
advantages accruing, in the shape of Duzdap customs revenues, from the
operation of the Mirjawa-Duzdap section of the Nushki extension railway,
they must make some effort to assert their authority over the Sarhaddi tribes
and to establish that control in Sarhad without which the operation of the
railway is impossible. In paragraph 13 the Government of India recom
mended that, “ should satisfactory arrangements be made in Sarhad ” in the
above sense, the Persian Government should be offered the ownership of the
Mirjawa-Duzdap line subject to detailed conditions which they proceeded to
indicate, for the continued operation of that section of the whole line.
Sir P. Loraine in his despatch No. 758 (Enelo. to Serial No. 13) of
p.. 527—23 (E.- H 25 - 207 - 24 '. December 30th, 1922, expressed general
concurrence with the Government of
India, especially in regard to the point that “ the question of the railway and
that of the control of the Sarhad are so intimately linked together that they
must be regarded as inter-dependent for the purpose of°any satisfactory
settlement ”, After sketching the measures which it would be desirable to
induce the Persian Government to undertake for the maintenance of the
control hitherto exercised by British detachments on Persian territory, he
pointed out that there seemed to be two alternative methods of negotiation
with the Persian Government, and expressed his preference for the second, viz.,
“ that the Persian Government should be informed at the outset that
the
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