ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٦] (٨٩٦/٤٤٩)

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3. As I understand the situation the Persian authorities at Kirman
and Seistan have framed proposals for dealing with the situation in Persian
Baluchistan, but there seems in these proposals to be distinct lack of co-
ordination and a manifestation on the part of each Government of a desire
to secure for himself the exercise of authority over this, so far independent
tract. Briefly put the Kirman Government desires to advance this year
to Bam and Began, to consolidate there and to collect supplies and next
year advance to Bampur. The Shaukat on the other hand desires to advance
from Seistan into K hwash this year and from there open negotiations with
Post Muhammad which he hopes may, combined with the show of force
he will be able to make, succeed in securing the submission of that Chief.
4. It has been decided that unless the Persians take steps of some
promptitude to introduce a satisfactory state of affairs in Persian Balu
chistan it will be necessary to reconsider the position of the railway, and
they are, apparently at any rate, concerting measures to this end. The
question of what measures, political or military, they are to take, is
obviously one for the Persians alone and the only degree to which we may
legitimately busy ourselves with their plans is to consider to what extent
the furtherance of these plans may necessitate a change in our position in
the Sarhad, notably at Khwash where we continue to occupy with a military
garrison a portion of this tract of Persian Baluchistan.
5. The influence of Dost Muhammad Khan over the Damanis of the
^arhad has even in the last few months shown signs of noticeable increase
from which one is led to the conclusion that the approaching danger of
materialisation of Persian schemes for the subjugation of Persian Balu-
i chistan has by awakening a sense of common danger and strengthening
the heredity Persian-Baluch antagonism assisted materially the growth
of the influence in the Sarhad of Dost Muhammad Khan to whom
by his admitted ability and successes the Baluch in the whole of that
tract look as their leader. That Dost Muhammad would succumb to an
adequate show of efficient force is undoubted, but unless and until he is
assured that such force will without fail be launched against him, he may
be reckoned on to oppose by intrigue and the creation of trouble any
attempts at penetrations.
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Hence I am agreed with all the local officers of this administration !
i; : concerned in thinking that the KeyTo the situation is an advance bn Bampur
and the subjugation of this tract, and that any attempt to nibble at the |
situation fiom the Seistan side through Khwash will fail to secure the \
desired result and will merely induce increased unrest. Any attempt such ‘
as that suggested by the Shaukat to come into Sarhad is bound to arouse
lively opposition. Consequently the simultaneous presence of our detach
ment at Khwash with that of the force the Shaukat has proposed to brum
there would create an impossible situation f raught with danger to the small
body of our troops there and to our diplomatic relations with Persia. The
Persians have an undoubted right to come into Khwash and consequently
all we can do is to inform them, clearly that if they do elect to exercise that
Sight our troops will make over to them our positions in the Sarhad and
withdraw, on which our relations with the Sarhad tribes will cease
' absolutely.
The continuance of the railway will then depend on the amount of
control that the Persians are enabled to maintain. If as suggested bv
Colonel Haworth m para. 19 of his letter the gesture made from the
oeistan side is to the North outside the more central Sarhad, it would not
a ^^^ r i, neCeSSar ^ to ciec ^ e on 80 definite a course of withdrawal but it
would have to be realised that the situation might develop owing to actions
and intrigues taken by the Baluch to anticipate the Persians and that onr
a ready difficult position at Khwash might become so untenable as to neces
sitate withdrawal An advance from the Kirman side on Bam this vear
while less fraught with danger to our troops at Khwash must always'con-
tam the elements of difficulty from trouble engineered on the SaNiad In
any case the situation would require careful watching. r 11
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