ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎٣‎٢‎١] (٨٩٦/٦٤٠)

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cause serious trouble in Persian Baluchistan We cannot expect that, should
the occasion arrive, the Bolshevik agents will not prove much more effective.
The agency by which the trouble vras spread in 1915 and 19^6 is just as
active now° The followers of the Lai Ealandar are found in every villas
ive now. xne roiiowers Oi iuc al ' e t l lull ‘J, “ f™? • D ‘
on either side of the border, and the pilgrims of the Shewan shrine are
contirmally coming and going.
16 It was only strong action in Jhalawan in 1915 and 1916 and the
presence of the Makran Mission that prevented Makran and Jhalawan
forming a very dangerous focus of disturbance stretching right up to Sind and
the railway.
Should trouble arise with Afghanistan and the present impression of our
weakness and neglect in Makran not have been dispelled, the situation would
probably develop very rapidly to our detriment, and cause a serious embarrass-,
ment on the flank of our army.
17. The present situation is largely due to uncertainty. Makran has.
suffered from continual makeshifts, aud the unfortunate experiment o placing
tne country under the unchecked and unassisted rule ot Mir Azam Jan had the
most unsettled effect. What is now required,internally is a regular constitm
tion with the promise of permanency,, and externally a firm policy towards
the Persian Baluchistan Sardars. The first can be attained at once and the
possibilities for establishing the second, besides depending to a great extent on
contentment on our side of the border, have been much improved by the
construction of the fair weather roads bringing Panjgur within 2 days of
Quetta and Hand within 5 days.
18. It is very necessary both from the Imperial-and from the fetate point
of view to so organise this frontier as to avoid the necessity of sending regular
troops whenever any trouble occurs. The Makran Levy Corps has now two
small mountain guns in the use of which the artillery section is fairly efficient.
It is bein^ provided with a small amount of mechanical transport which will
make rapid movement possible from Panjgur to Parom and briawag, between
the Pan itnir and Kech valleys, and between Turbat and Mand. The only thing
' necessary to enable the Levy Corps to tackle any of the numerous small forts
such as Irafshan which form basts for raids would be a couple of trench
mortars. As trench mortars are too dangerous weapons to entrust to partially
trained men it would be necessary to send them out witu a trained detacmnent.
Lorries can now reach any post on the border within 7 days from Quetta.
Should slightly larger numbers be required on the frontier for any special
occasion, it would be preferable to send tribal levies which the Sardars are
bound to supply on the demand ol the Khan.
19. Mehrab Khan has recently returned from a visit to Dost Muhammad
to whom he was sent by my predecessor to endeavour to effect a settlement in
connection with the Tump raid. He reports that Dost Muhammad is. nervous
lest the Persian Government should re*cccupy Bampur, and is anxious to be
friends with us, but that if we ask him to coerce Brahim Khan he will ask us
for money and troops.
I am calling him in to meet me in the neighbourhood of Panjgur in
February.
T. KEYES, Lieut.-Col.,
Political Agent, Kalat.
MEMORANDUM G.
;.k
Proposition Statement op Makran Levy Corps.
In 1014 one British Officer and 150 men were added to the Makran Levy
Corps in order to provide His Highness the Khan with a guard ot honour auu
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