ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٣‎٥‎٩] (٨٩٦/٧١٥)

CONFIDENTIAL
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No. 1685, dated Quetta, the 2nd May 1923.
From The Hon’ble Mb F. W Johnston, C.S.I., C.I.B., I.C.S., Agent to tie
Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan.
Subject.— Administration of Kalat State.
xt ° f iet ^ er “ No - 344 > dated the 30th January 1923, [Serial
A 0 '-nlL ha 7 e the h< a ou r to forward a copy of a letter No. 1200, dated the 21st
April 1923, from the Political Agent kalat, reporting his meeting with Mir Dost
Muhammad khan of Bampur and the results of the interview.
2. The position on the Mekran border and the results locally of these serious
raids from Persian territory for which no semblance of reparation has been made
have already been described m Colonel Keyes’ letter No. 1-Q., dated the 7th Janu
ary 1923, which formed an enclosure to my letter under reference. In that letter
it was stated that an effort at settlement would be made by a meeting with Dost
Muhammad Khan. T hat meeting has taken place and has proved infructuous.
r, -x- 3 ! ? k aS ’ ? undersand, been decided that the present temporary location of
British troops m Persian territory in the Sarhad should be brought to an end as
soon as arrangements are made for the future of the Nushki-Seistan Railway, or
at any rate, that portion of it which lies in Persian territory. These arrangements 5
if they contemplate the retention of the line and adequate'assurances for its protec-
tion, must include satisfactory control by the Persians over the Sarhad and as
the Sarhad and the portion of Persian Baluchistan on the Kharan-Mekran border
act and react on each other, this control cannot be maintained so long as the present
state of anarchy in the South is permitted to remain. It seems clear therefore
that any Persian arrangements for introducing administrative control in the Sarhad
must be accompanied by the introduction of similar co ntrol to the South also.
So far the Persian Government have entirely failed to take any action regarding the
hostile attitude of their subjects on the Mekran border, the serious raids committed
by them, from Persian into British territory, the making of reparation for the
offences committed and the ensuring for the future the maintenance of a state of
affairs more in consonance with international comity.
I have just been informed in your Memo. No. 337-519-F. of the 20th April
1923 [Serial No. 12] that representations will be made to the Central Persian
Government on receipt of certain details. This information will be supplied as
soon as possible. For the reasons summarised above and given in more detail
in Colonel Keyes’ letter it would appear to be difficult to separate the Sarhad
from South Persian Baluchistan, and it would seem to be advisable in making
the representations to point out that unless effective control is established in South
Persian Baluchistan no adequate assurance can exist for the protection of the rail
way.
4. In the event of a Persian move in South Persian Baluchistan co-operation
such as is suggested by Colonel Keyes in paragraphs 24—26 of his letter would be
of undoubted value, but its giving would of course be entirely dependent on the
Persian Government asking for it or being willing to accept it. At the same time
while we could with a clear conscience readily assist against the South Persian
Baluch tribes, against whom there is a long score, the situation is very different in the
Sarhad where we could not with any regard to past relations do more than quietly
withdraw. If it is accepted that the Sarhad and South Persian Baluchistan form
integral parts of one problem, it seems very possible that complications might
ensue from the offer in one part of co-operation and active military assistance
which under present conditions we could certainly not give in the other part. It
would therefore seem advisable to suppress all mention of co-operation and assist
ance, for the present at all events. Should subsequent developments render co
operation in South Persian Baluchistan advisable and feasible without any attend
ant complications, it could be given under the arrangements suggested by Colonel
Keyes.
Should the Persians refrain from taking any action in South Persian Baluchis-
,tan, or take unsuccessful action, the difficulties on the Mekran-Kharan border—•
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