ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎٣‎٦‎١] (٨٩٦/٧٢٠)

facilitated by the roads already constructed and, when we have completed the
system we should have no cause for anxiety if larger political considerations per-
mitted'us to assume an active defensive ; but, though Persia has long abandoned
this frontier, we are forced to respect it.
18 Bolshevik Propaganda. —Bolshevik propaganda is establishing a base in
I Persian Baluchistan, and it is necessary to recall the ease with which German
' propaganda penetrated as far as the Sind border in 1916, though these regions were
then virgin soil and the people fairly contented.
Our failure to protect our subjects from raids by these contemptible adver
saries and to exact reparation for their misdeeds have had a very disturbing
efiect in Makran and Jhalawan : and it is essential if Bolshevik propaganda ,s
hot to'be given an easier task than the Germans had, that action should betaken
to restore confidence.
19 Necessity of persuading Persia to control her Frontier Province.-There
are only two alternativer-to act ourselves against the Baranzais and other raiders
or to assist the Persian Government to re-establish its authority.
As the problems of the Makran and Kharan border cannot be taken alone, but
must be considered with that of the railway, at the terminus of which Persia
has established her authority, the latter is the only feasible course.
20 Claims against Persia,—l therefore propose that the Persian Government
should be informed of the damages we claim for the larger raids which took place m
between 1914 and 1920, i.e., the Parom raid of 1914 the Maud raid of 1915, the
Tump raid of 1921, and for the many minor raids of the last two years, and be
asked to re-establish their authority in Persian Baluchistan.
21. Connection, for Persia between various Frontier proWcm.-It would be
lust as unwise for Persia to regard the problems of the railway, the Sarhad and South
Pemian Baluchistan as separate as it would be for us The British admimstra ion
of the railway is the wound to their nmmr jpropre which compels them to take an
interest in this frontier, but the administration of the railway would be an unpossi-
bility for them m le> s the Sarhad were safe ; and Persian control of the Sarhad with
anarchy in the South would be, at the best, very unstable. Moreover we could not
reskin the position we were compelled by Persia’s incompetence to assume m the
Sarhad and at Duzdap without requiring of her security of the southern ha
the frontier.
22 Difficulties confronting Persia.—It must be remembered that Persia has
never attempted any control of the Sarhad, and such control as she exerciMd
Bampur was !utterly only exercised owing to our co-operation, and was jtbandon
fifteen years ago. The authorities in Tehran were in those days extremely ignorant
of what was going on in Persian Baluchistan and we can be certain that ttar
ignorance of the complicated politics and physical difficulties of operations
these desolate regions is profound. For Persia to tackle the problem piecem
would be to court disaster, and for Persia to fail would result, for us, m the last state
of this frontier being worse than the first.
23 Results of Persian failure.—Should Persia fail in the Sarhad and Southern
Baluchistan it would undoubtedly have the effect of so "Tesent
the petty Sardars as to render them much more formidable than they are at P' es >
and I should be compelled to ask for extra strength and largely increased expend.-
luxe on the Kalat frontier.
24. Necessity for British co-operation.—Wuttevei the revival of the Peraan
Army may amoLt to, we must recognize the fact that two stnall forces whose
prestige is yet to establish, and whose administrative services a y .
existent, cannot operate with any charce of success so far from their as
regions so inhospitable if there be any opposition. Opposition ^ e “ rta ^
be unless we co-operate by political action and a show of unanimi y
Persia. •
25. Arguments in favour of co-operation.—The co-operation that ^as so succes^
ful in 1901 and 1902 should be an admirable argument for sum a p