ملف ‎٤٤٨٠\ ١٩٢٣ الجزء ١ "الخليج الفارسي: ملكية شط العرب" [ظ‎‎٣‎٥‎١] (٧٣٢/٧١٥)

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these matters in a friendly spirit by the usual methods of diplomacy. On the contrary,
their policy appears to be simply to try and push us out. I may cite the following
instances : (1) Instead of expressing any appreciation of the admirable work done
over a long period of years by our quarantine officers in the Gulf, it looks as though
by refusing to vote any credits for their pay in the budget, they hope that these officers _
will all disappear; ( 2 ) instead of raising the question of our wireless stations on
Persian territory, their policy is to starve these stations out by prohibiting the imports
of any spare parts until the time arrives when the stations ivill be unable to function ;
(3) instead of notifying me that in future they wish the visits of British warships to
Persian ports to be notified to them in accordance with international custom, they
refuse permission for H.M.S. limterprise to lie alongside the jetty at Abadan. In
this connexion I should perhaps explain that while technically a ship lying alongside
the jetty is, according to existing treaties still in Iraq waters, yet the placing of a gang
way connecting the said ship with Persian territory can undoubtedly be prevented by
the Persian authorities.
11 . You will observe that in my letter to Taimourtache I referred to the matter
of Persian Gulf questions in general and enquired why the Persian Government
should not try to come to a friendly understanding with us. His reply is not very
encouraging. “ Nous esperons,” he says, “ que d’autres questions telles que . . ...
nos reclamations et notre situation au golfe Persique seront^ resolus a notre avantage.
I will revert to the matter further in conversation with his Excellency.
12 . Finally, I would draw your special attention to the following statement in
Mr. Jack’s notes of his conversation with Taimourtache :—
His Excellency informed Mr. Jacks that his Government was out to bring
all possible pressure to bear on Iraq with a view to recovering its rights in the
Shatt-el-Arab River, which had wrongly been taken from it. Under no
consideration, therefore, would his Excellency permit the port office to be
established on Persian territory.”
This point also I shall raise with his Excellency in conversation. I shall point
out. to him that he has submitted proposals for the recognition of Iraq by Persia,
that I am awaiting instructions to reply to these proposals, that it was only a
fortnight ago that for the first time he raised directly with me the question of the
frontier line in the Shatt-el-Arab, and that I consider it therefore most extraordinary—
if not unfriendly—behaviour on the part of the Persian Government to try and force
our hands in these matters while the whole question of Iraq is under negotiation
through the usual diplomatic channels.
13. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosures to the Foreign
Secretary to the Government of India, to His Majesty’s High Commissioner for Iraq
and to His Majestv’s consul-general at Bushire.
I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.
Postscript, A pi'il 21.
Since writing the above I have had occasion to see the Minister of Court. 1 told
his Excellency exactly what I thought of Prince Firuz’s behaviour in the South.
I had long since been convinced that the Prince was animated by a vindictive desire,
dating from the events of 1921, to oppose British interests in every way. For a year
he had now been Minister of Finance, and during that period this Legation had been
unable to get the smallest, thing settled with that Department.
His behaviour at Abadan was not only outrageous but stupid. If his original
orders had been upheld there would have been not only dislocation of traffic in the
river but serious financial loss to the Anglo-Persiau Oil Company, followed probably
by heavy claims against the Persian Government.
To threaten the Port of Basra Office with ejection by military force if they were
not gone within twenty-four hours was behaviour which could not be described in any
suitable diplomatic language at my command. His Excellency was at pains to excuse
Prince Firuz for any malevolent intentions. He could only suppose that as a Minister
of Finance, finding in the course of his tour things which were irregular, he had taken
the necessary steps to regularise the position, although his Excellency admitted that
he appeared to have shown a needless lack of consideration. He himself differentiated
so far as possible between politics and commerce. He had, therefore, sent immediate
instructions that nothing was to be done which in any way interfered with the
legitimate operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in loading ships whether