خارجي ٦٥٥٢/ ٤١ "منظومة الأمن في بلاد فارس" [و‎‎٨‎٥] (٣٢٠/١٦٩)

I
VA
\X&
^ith the Cornr>i^meritft
^ jit-' tHe
r^oretapy of SUte
oneign Affairs i
^ &2j^ ' y
/^C&OyJ
nnar
y*\
V-/
[Cypher], <■)
^ SECP ^
*4 0
Ws z
i 1
DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.
N TO ED REIGN OFFICE.
Sir R. Bullard.
No,. 991.
oth August, IVl'?.
D. 11.0 p.m. 8th August, 191-2.
R. 2,1-5 a.m. 9th August, 1912.
Repeated' to Minister of State No.271.
Bagdad for G.O.C. No.333.
A *’ v ^ (Saj/U-f.) f $4JL frhiArC, ,
BMEDIATE.
Your telegram
WWW ^ / / st c* j,
Afr Mc/v /z 4-rrK~//*'*~i<3£l X &
i No_.N755 to Minister of State and Minister
o£\t>
of S tate's tele gram No,1231.
New Prime Minister acted with great promptitude on my
request i for the arrest of about A5 suspects, Within 21. hours
nearly all had been arrested and others have been arrested
since, I wrote asking that they should be handed over to the
British authorities and followed up my letter by a visit to
the Prime Minister who had with him Minister for Foreign Affairs
in latter cabinet who is to hold the same office in the new one.
Prime Minister, while friendly and ready to co-operate was not
prepared to hand over suspects (except few non-Persians) since
that he considers against Persia sovereignty and therefore
contrary to Article 1 of the Treaty. He said that he could not
at the outset [?grp.omtd: ?of] his administration add to his
many difficulties the hostility which handing over suspects would
arouse., He proposed suspects should be detained in Tehran under
Persian and British supervision and that interrogation should
be carried out by. a mixed commission, the Persian members to
be approved by us.
2. I said my instructions were to ask for suspects to be
handed over to us. In view of our experience of Persian police
this was the only procedure which would afford us proper
protection. He would incur little if any more odium for handing
• over than he had already done for arresting suspects. As to
the Treaty, I said as British were combatant and Persians non-
combatant ally it was his duty to give us maximum assistance.
It.seemed clear however that Prime Minister would not change his
opinion, so to avoid awkward impasse, I suggested on the strength
of your teleg ram No.1735 which I had just seen, that I should
explore "the possiouiity 'of detention under joint supervision at
Kermanshah or some other place on the plateau but in the area
occupied by our troops. Prime Minister held out for detention
at Tehran. I objected that whichever place might be selected
Tehran would not do because it is a centre of intrigue and
to avoid communication between suspects and friends outside would
be impossible. Prime Minister offered to allow us to post as
many guards as we wished from the present moment. He also said
that if we were not satisfied with the result of a joint enquiry
we could subsequently conduct another one on our own and he would
leave it to us to decide whether any given suspect should be
released or retained.