"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٧] (٤٠٨/٢٢٠)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.!
fcASIEH.\ (A kaiiia ) . [November 3, 1926.J
CONFIDENTIAL. ' Seotion
^ ^ 7
[E 6118/180/91] No j y i.
(No 1I2G) foreign Office to Acting Consul Jordan {Jeddak).
Sir
' * q , Foreign Office, November 3, 1926.
f ^;? U k' 1 o ^ Majesty's Government have decided to accede to the
reques w ic . lis Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd made, in the
course of his discussions with Sir G. Clayton during the latter's mission to negotiate
set ements ot certain outstanding questions concerning Iraq and Transiordan, to
the ettect that the treaty concluded with him in 1916 should be revised. The King
o ic ojaz was informed in April last that His Majesty's Government would be
prepared to discuss the question of the revision of the treaty with him at an early
, His Majesty s Government have given careful consideration to this question,
and 1 am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you the
enc osed drait of a revised treaty which will indicate to you the matters witn which
they consider the treaty might deal.
3. His Majesty's Government do not wish to bind you to the precise terms of
this diait, or, as is explained below, in certain matters to insist upon its provisions
to the jeopardy of the whole of the negotiations; but, seeing that Ibn Saud has for
some months held himself in readiness for the opening of the negotiations, you mav
think it desirable to place the drait, either in whole or in part, before him, without
any detailed preliminary conversations, as representing His Majesty's Government's
views as to the form which the new treaty should take.
4. His Majesty's Government are, however, content to leave you to decide the
exact procedure to be adopted. The following information regarding the policy of
His Majesty's Government towards the questions dealt with in the various articles
of the dratt treaty, and towards such other questions as may be raised during your
conversations with Ibn Saud, is communicated to you for your guidance m the
negotiations.
5. In general. His Majesty's Government consider that the treaty should
include as little detail as possible, and they would prefer not to protract the negoti
ations unduly by the discussion of disputed questions; since such questions may be
settled more readily when a new treaty has been concluded.
6. In regard to the terms of the draft treaty which accompanies this despatch,
His Majesty's Government wish, if possible, to retain the provision in the second
sentence of article 1 whereby each of the high contracting parties undertakes to
prevent the use of his territory as a base for activities directed against the other;
but you may, in the last resort, agree to the omission of this sentence if its inclusion
should be strongly opposed by Ibn Saud, and if, in your opinion, his opposition is
unlikely to be overcome.
7. As regards article 3, I am to explain that the Government of India attach
great importance to the inclusion in the treaty of some provision which would
safeguard Indian Moslems during the pilgrimage, since great indignation has been
aroused in India by the intolerance exhibited by the Wahabis during the recent
pilgrimage. His Majesty's Government have no desire to depart from their declared
policy of non-interference in religious matters; and they have decided not to adopt a
suggestion made by the Government of India that the article should be amplified by
inserting a provision to secure that British pilgrims should enjoy freedom of
religious observance and rites. At the same time, they feel that, in deference to
Indian opinion, it is important that the treaty should include some provision on the
lines of the draft article, even though it may secure little more than is secured by the
ordinary international sanctions.
8. Article 6 repeats the provision of aiticle 6 of the treaty of 1916, save that
no reference is made to the question of determining the limits of the territories
mentioned. His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the
question whether Ibn Saud should be invited to agree to refrain from aggression on
the rulers of the Persian Gulf coast. It appeared to them doubtful whether, in
practice, such an engagement would effectively deter Ibn Saud if he were determined
[1451 c—1] - b