"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٩] (٤٠٨/٢٢٥)

13. In the same month the Sheikh of Dibai received a letter, purport of which
has only now been communicated to me.* In it the Amir of Hasa conveys a serious
threat against the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.
14. In February 19126 it was reported that the Amir of Hasa had sent a posse
of police to Shargah in pursuit of a Nejdi criminal. In the letter addressed to the
sheikh the extradition of the criminal was demanded. The accused was not found
and the Nejdi police went on to Ajman and Ras-al-Khaimah. Apparently the man
escaped detection. Incidentally, it was reported at the same time that Najdi slave-
traders were boldly bringing African negroes and (according to later reports) war
captives down to the coastal towns for sale; and, further, that the Trucial sheikhs
were afraid to interfere with them.
15. In March 1926, the Amir, Ibn ^aluwi, sent two superior officials, Said and
Ibn Mansur, to collect zikat in Dhafrah and Baraimi.
16. In two judicial cases recently the Amir of Hasa has written (a) to the
Kazi of Shargah and (b) to the Sheikh of Dibaf chiding them for not satisfying
Nejdi complainants. The Kazi sent his son to Hofuf to express regret.
17. To sum up the position, it would seem that the Amir of Hasa has two
immediate objectives: (1) To include Trucial Oman and ' Independent Oman
in toto in the Kingdom of Nejd; and (2) to get into direct contact (including the
task of protecting its tribes) with a large district of the Sultanate of Oman, which
is opposed to the Imam and at the same time is almost independent of the
Sultan.
18. To serve both objectives, he must first absorb the whole of Dhafrah—a
region of about 14,000 square miles, which stretches 175 miles from west to east
and 80 from north to south, bounded on the north by the Persian Gulf and on the
south by the Ruba'-al-Khali (Great Desert). This region, along with three smaller
coastal tracts to its west, all historically and de jure belong to the Sheikh of
Abu Dhabi.
19. East of Dhafrah. the Wahabis will have little difficulty in procuring the
submission of the people of Baraimi, Hafit and Dhahirah, some on account of their
antipathy for Abu Dhabi, and the others being hostile to the Ibadhis.
20. As regards the Trucial chiefs themselves, I believe that if they see the
annexation of Dhafrah and Baraimi achieved they will seek the best possible terms
for themselves from Ibn Sand and offer to join the Nejd State. Jhey will be satisfied
if they can obtain recognition as hereditary and permanent Governors of their
respective territories.
A large portion of their subjects are Hanbali in sect, and they have not
forgotten that a hundred years ago they were Wahabis themselves The Kazis in all
the chiefships except Abu Dhabi and Dibai are actually Najdis.
21. In these circumstances it seems to me that if His Majesty's Government
wish to preserve the individuality of the Trucial chiefships and at the same time to
safeguard Muscat from aggression, they must ask the Ruler of Nejd in peremptory
language to compel his representative in Hasa to observe the boundary accepted in
1922 (with or without the rest of Jafurah) to abstain from minatory acts against
the Trucial chiefs, and, in important cases, to address this Residency about inter-
Statal matters.
22. It will be remembered that in 1923 a very similar complaint of encroach
ments on Katar's independence was telegraphed to you in Colonel Knox's No. 838,
dated the 21st September, 1923. Ibn Saud was given a severe warning on receipt of
your telegram of the 12th November, 1923, since when no occasion to complain about
Katar has arisen.
Whether Ibn Saud will be equally attentive to remonstrance now in his changed
circumstances remains to be seen.
23. I think, personally, that the time has come for a stronger political influence
to be introduced into the Trucial States than that of the Arab Residency Agent.
Only the presence of a British officer will encourage the chiefs to resist the subtle
and intensive propaganda which the Wahabis notoriously push on their other
frontiers.
24. Alternatively, the question has to be faced : " If the chiefs jointly, or
one or more of them separately, express their intention—in defiance of treaty
obligations, but without repudiating the maritime truce—to enter the Nejd State,
will His Majesty's Government accept the situation?" The difficulties of our
* Enclosure 5 in No. 1.