"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٣] (٤٠٨/٢٥٣)

question and to the policy of non-interference in religions questions pursued by His
Majesty's Government, we could not see our way to insert a clause in the treaty^
but that we should be prepared to give Ibn Sa'ud a written statement to the effect
that His Majesty's Government would Avhenever possible use their good offices 1
towards assisting him in the recovery of those revenues, on the distinct understanding,
however, that such assistance would be left entirely to the discretion of His Majesty's
Government, and that, in any case, it would not entail any interference in the usual
procedure or the sentences of the competent courts. After some discussion, Ibn Sa ud
recognised the force of our argument and withdrew the clause.
18. Hejaz Railway. —Efforts were made by Ibn Sa'ud to draw this question
into the orbit of the treaty negotiations and to insert a clause relating to it in the
proposed treaty. In the Protocol attached to his first draft (Annex 1)* as well
as in article 7 of his second draft (Annex 3),* he had demanded the wholesale
restitution oi those sections of the railway which lie in Palestine and Transjordan,
on the plea that the railway was the acknowledged property of the Moslem world
and that the Hejaz Government were the only authority in whom the administration
ot pan-Islamic property could properly be vested. It was only after considerable
discussion that we were able to persuade Ibn Sa ud that this question, involving as
it did the French Government, could have no place in a treaty between Great
Britain and himself. We reminded him of the terms of the Joint Lausanne
Declaration of 1923, of which the text had been formally communicated to him some
months previously; and we explained to him why it could serve no useful purpose to
suggest that the administration of the sections lying in mandated territory might
be handed over by the Mandatory Power to a foreign Government. We also gave
him to understand that it was not part of our mission to negotiate a settlement
involving a departure from the principles laid down.
Having accepted to treat this question as a separate issue, and within the
limits stated. Ibn Sa ud proceeded to define his attitude. He declared that he would
no longer insist on an immediate discussion of general principles, but that he would
content himself with pointing out that the Hejaz had not been a party to the
Lausanne Declaration of 1923, and that he wished the British Government to know
that the Hejaz Government was reserving its Treedom of action with regard to the
contents of the Declaration. At the same time, he wished to impress upon His
Majesty's Government the obvious desirability of putting the railway into running
order before the coming pilgrimage if possible; and with this object in view he
would request His Majesty's Government to place at once at the disposal of the
Hejaz Government a sufficient sum of money (approximately £50,000) and an
adequate quantity of rolling-stock to enable it to repair the Hejazian section of
the line and organise a train service against the coming pilgrimage; it being
understood that this sum would be treated as an advance on account pending the
final settlement.
In putting forward this request, Ibn Sa'ud declared repeatedly that he would
regard it as a distinct favour if His Majesty's Government were to arrange at
once for the required advance to be made out of the revenues which he believed to
have accrued from the working of the Hejaz Railway in mandated territory.
Not content with verbal declarations, he caused a letter to be sent to us by his
Foreign Secretary on the eve of our departure from Jedda, of which we append a
translation (Annex 7).
We informed Ibn Sa'ud that we would convey to His Majesty's Government
a clear statement of the substance of his request; but we abstained from giving him
any indication, even conjectural, as to the likelihood of his request being acceded to.
(c.) Conclusions.
19. We have endeavoured to show, in the preceding paragraphs, the degree of
divergence to which our conversations had brought us; and we propose now to
retrace, as briefly as possible, the steps by which we were led to interrupt the
negotiations and the reasons which, in our opinion, rendered such an interruption
necessary.
20. When, on the 4th December, Ibn Sa'ud handed in his third draft
(Annex 5), which purported to represent his final offer, we were faced with a
* Not printed.