"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٨] (٤٠٨/٣٤٣)

close attention of His Majesty's Government during the last eighteen months or
more, and that, having now received and studied a very full report of the
conversations that had taken place at Wadi al Aqiq in December last. His Majesty's
Government had reached conclusions, in regard to' the various points of divergence,
which were based on a thorough consideration of the situation viewed from every
standpoint.
The King replied by a long dissertation on the political situation as affecting
the Hejaz, the \emen and Italy. He mentioned that he had received delegates from
the Imam in Mecca and that he had written quite frankly in reply pointing out,
first, that the Idrisi was his good friend and that he felt bound to protect him from
aggression and, secondly, that the Imam's relations with foreign Powers should be
so conducted as to cultivate the friendship of Great Britain while avoiding any
entanglements with weaker Powers which might involve him in difficulties which
would affect the whole of Arabia. He concluded by stating that he had received a
friendly reply from the Imam, and went as far as to produce the actual letter.
He discussed, at some length, Italian policy in the Red Sea, with special
reference to the Yemen, and expressed some anxiety as to the results which mi (r ht
arise from the Italian Treaty with the Imam Yahya.
bir Gilbert Clayton assured His Majesty that the results of his conversations
m Rome could in no way menace the interests of the Hejaz and Nejd. Indeed, the
fact that both parties were agreed to abstain from any interference in the internal
affairs of Arabia could only be to the advantage of Ibn Saud's Government.
Sir G. Clayton then briefly sketched the main points of the proposed treaty,
regarding which he observed that substantial agreement had been reached at Wadi
al Aqiq except on the following four major points :—
{a.) The recognition of the position of His Majesty's Government in mandated
territories.
{h.) 1 he question of the slave trade.
(c.) The clause regarding nationality, to which Ibn Saud wished to add a
provision which gave rise to serious consideration.
{d.) The frontier between the Hejaz and Trans-Jordan as laid down in the draft
protocol.
After informing the King that His Majesty's Government had decided to meet
his views by not insisting on a specific recognition in the treaty of their position in
mandated territories. Sir G. Clayton dealt with three other points and explained
to Ibn baud the various considerations which precluded His Majesty's Government
from meeting his views, laying special stress on the questions of the slave trade and
Trans-Jordan frontier. fie stated that he quite appreciated Ibn Saud's
dilhcuit^S' but he was convinced, and he felt that he was also expressing the views
o His Majesty, that to postpone settlement was likely to increase rather than
decrease those difficulties.
Ibn Saud stated that he was quite confident of the good intentions and friendlv
spirit of His Majesty's Government and emphasised that he was not raisin"-
objections m any spirit of opposition to the principles upheld by His Maiestv's
Government, but that his difficulties were very real ones and such as he could not
possibly ignore.
2rd Meeting.
for ti!i ll L third T^ ng w { a ® held a . t 9 A - M - on the 11th May, in the house set apart
lor the accommodation of the mission.
P roc ^ edin S s by referring to the question of the slave
dislnr'nHrm P' 1 ' lhlhe(1 110 tact that drastic measures would entail serious social
Mt that hp nn w na ? C ■ , was " nw,lli ng to give any undertakings which he
the pvil f .(tJ 'f'" d rl , , ar 7 ' a ' un ' ess he was placed in a position to counteract
the evil effects which he foresaw must ensue, he found it very difficult to meet the
some ^nrm nfnr Ma:,eSt f S Gove ™ment. (This appeared to be an obvious hint for
some form of compensation.) At the same time, he was entirely in agreement in
was L in f'ipt prmt S s Government o n the question of the slave trade, which
as, in fact contrary to the Shana law, and it was only his conviction that serious
Lsorganisauon would result from drastic measures that prevented him from takino-
immediate action in the sense required.