الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎٩‎٤] (٣٢/٥)

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Minute by the Hon^le Sir Richard Temple
k. c. s. i.y— dated Simla, the 29^i September
187i.
I regret to 1)6 obliged to record my
dissent from the despatch of the Gov
ernment of India, to the Secretary of
State, conveying a recommendation that
the Fortress of Gwalior and the Can
tonment of Morar be abandoned by the
British Troops. I consider that such an
abandonment would be dangerous politi
cally to British interests in that important
part of India, and cannot be adequately
justified by any considerations, whether
political, military, sanatory, or financial.
2. In the first place, Gwalior is one of
those dominant positions by the retention
of which the security of the British power
is ensured. Its importance in all ages and
under all dynasties has been great. That
importance has become greater than ever
since the perilous events of 1857. In the
urgent interest of the British power in
Northern India we had to assume posses
sion of that place. Among other things,
this measure was absolutely necessary to
the safety of Sindiah himself. We have
kept it during the fourteen years which
have since elapsed.
8. The reasons for the maintenance of
our possession are just as valid now as
they were then. There are dangerous
classes both at that place itself and in the
territories around it. The power of
Sindiah, unaided by us, to keep his people
in order at time of trouble is very uncer
tain. He failed in this respect, however
excellent his intentions may have been,
in 1857. There is no real reason why
he should succeed better now. If he
were, in time of general danger, to
succumb or to collapse as he did in 1857,
that would be most prejudicial to the
British cause. This might well be antici
pated if the British force were withdrawn
from Gwalior. The chance of such a mis
fortune would be greatly reduced if the
British force were present.
4. I see it stated that our power in
India is maintained by our prowess in the
field. So far true, no doubt. But that
power is also maintained by our posses
sion of dominant positions, of strong
holds, of obligatory points. Let the poli
tical map of India be examined, and it
will be seen how much we owe to our