الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎٩‎٥] (٣٢/٧)

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status of Sindiah really depends upon us.
Whether His Highness would acknow
ledge it or not, such is actually the case.
When our power in Hindostan in
1857-58 was jeopardised, Sindiah was
temporarily subverted. He is not a
Native ruler ruling over his own kith
and kin, or even over a homogeneous race;
he is a foreign and alien Mahratta in the
eyes of his subjpcts. He rules over a
northern race, which speaks a different
language, and is interspersed with a Raj
poot landed aristocracy. There are tur
bulent classes among his people, who
would probably try to depose him if the
visible support of the British power were
withdrawn. I do not mean in the least to
disparage His Highness. I only state the
fact. He cannot safely stand alone with
out us for a moment. Without the pre
sence of a British force I should appre
hend a possible disturbance at Gwalior,
in the event of the political atmosphere of
India being charged with any electricity.
It may be that, recognising this truth,
Sindiah has for years been forming an
efficient little army of his own—a
sort of efficiency, indeed, greater even
than might at first sight appear, may
have been attained. But this very
force may constitute a new and special
danger to Sindiah. The manner in
which the troops of many of our most
faithful allies in 1857-58 turned against
their own masters, and against the para
mount British Government, ought never
to be forgotten. And it is distinctly to be
feared that if Sindiah were left alone with
his own troops at his own capital, he
might be unable in time of trouble to
cope with a mutiny directed against him
and us.
8. Such difficulties could not arise, or,
if they arose, could be encountered with
much advantage and chance of success if
the British garrison remained in the
fortress which commands the city of
Gwalior, and overawes any evil-disposed
parties who might be there, and if the
garrison were supported outside by the
force cantoned at Morar. Therefore I
submit that we ought in no wise to inter
mit the existing precautions which depend
on the retention of the British force.
9. I fear that among the motives
which have actuated Sindiah in organising
his forces, there has been the misguided
hope of shewing himself capable of self
protection without our aid on the spot,