الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [ظ‎‎٩‎٥] (٣٢/٨)

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and thereby establishing grounds for
being relieved of the presence of the
British force. Now if we were to fall
into these views of His Highness, the
effect on opinion among other Native
States might be disadvantageous, and the
example might be inconvenient. Sindiah
is not the only Native State in India near
the capital of which a British force is
stationed. There are other States in the
same situation, notably Hyderabad, Indore,
Baroda, Mysore, and even the States, of
Rajpootana. If we agree now to with
draw from Gwalior, then how far is that
policy to be followed elsewhere ? Might
not other Native States begin to ponder
on the above question ? If so, the. spread
of such ideas might be inconvenient or
even dangerous. The safety of our
Native allies has always been cared for
by the British Government as paramount,
acting in its own interest as well as theirs.
So long as these allies believe themselves
to be unsafe, they desire the presence of
British troops just as much as we do.
But any one of them may believe him
self safe (however erroneous that belief
may be), and so believing might desire, by
improving his own forces, to prepare for
ultimate relief from the presence of
British troops.
10. No doubt, however much Sindiah
may once have desired the presence of the
British force, he now desires its withdrawal.
No doubt, also, he deserves well of us.
We, on the other hand, have acted entirely
well towards him, and fulfilled all our
obligations, and we should still endeavour
to meet his wishes as far as may be fairly
possible. But we cannot so far oblige
or gratify him as to compromise our own
just interests, or to endanger his safety in
which we have a legitimate concern. Up to
a certain point we must judge for our
selves ; and after duly considering his
wishes, we should, if necessary, be pre
pared to refuse compliance. He has
received from us all to which he is pro
perly entitled, and has no right to ask us
for more, or to expect any additional
concession which we may deem it incon
venient to grant.
11. Therefore I submit that we ought
not to abandon Gwalior, if we can reason
ably avoid that course. 12
12 Further, I apprehend that the
withdrawal of British troops from Gwalior
would immediately necessitate a revision