الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎٩‎٦] (٣٢/٩)

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of treaties, and would ultimately place
us in an invidious position in regard to
territorial cessions. It is on all hands
admitted that, by the treaty of 1860, we
are hound, in consideration of certain
Districts ceded to us, to maintain a certain
force within Sindiah’s territories. We now
propose to take the force away out of
his territories, hut to retain the ceded
Districts. It may be that Scindiah agrees
to the force being withdrawn without
asking for restoration of his Districts. It
is urged, also, that because previous
treaties are in force, except so far as they
may be altered by this treaty of 1860,
and because we may be considered bound
to maintain other forces outside or near
Sindiah’s frontier, therefore, in some way
or other, we may be deemed to fulfil our
obligations when, withdrawing from
Morar, we maintain a force in Hindostan
sufficient to enforce order in Gwalior if
necessary. I am not sure whether I put
the argument rightly, for I do not pretend
to comprehend it. Is this obligation by
treaty of 1860 to maintain a force within
Sindiah’s territories in force or not ?
Unquestionably, it is. How, then, can
we take away the force without giving
back the Districts P Manifestly the British
Government ought not to attempt this
without a revision of the treaty of 1860.
Such revision could not be attempted
without revival of the question of the
cession of Districts. Are we prepared to
restore them ? Certainly not, I presume.
Or if that were to be suggested, the whole
matter would be found to bristle with
objections and difficulties. Suppose, then,
that Sindiah were to agree that the force
should be withdrawn, notwithstanding
our retention of the Districts, would that
be a proper position for the British Gov
ernment to stand in ? I should say not.
Moreover, this is not the only instance in
India where we keep a British force near
the capital of a Native State under
treaties whereby we hold ceded territory.
If a negotiation were opened touching
the question in one great case like
Gwalior, the effect on other similar cases
might be inconvenient.
13. But even if Sindiah decided to
agree now that we should take away the
force and keep the Districts, how long
would he adhere to that decision? I
should think that no sooner was the back
of the British force turned than he would
begin to sigh for the Districts that had been