الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [ظ‎‎٩‎٦] (٣٢/١٠)

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signed away. If his disposition were to
be the same as it has been in other trans
actions, he would make a grievance out
of our retention of the Districts, perhaps,
even, he would press such grievance on
our consideration. If he were to do this,
he would he doing no more than what he
has done in this very matter of the fort.
The inconvenience of any such contin
gencies is so manifest that I need no
pursue the subject further. On the whole,
I regard the treaty of 1860 as a grea
obstacle to any negotiations being at
tempted for the withdrawal of the troops.
14. But it is urged that our present
occupation is weak ; that it could not be
strengthened without inordinate expense,
that the place is unhealthy for our
troops; that a constant sacrifice is
caused thereby; and that these are some
reasons, among others, for abandoning
Gwalior. Now I submit that these argu
ments, if examined, will be found suscep
tible of considerable abatement, and that
they are by no means strong enough to
counterbalance the powerful reasons on
the other side, that is, on the side of
retaining our occupation.
15. As to our military occupation
being weak, it may be not quite so strong
as we could wish. But the force, consist
ing of one regiment of Native cavalry, of
five batteries of artillery, of one European
regiment, of two Native infantry regiments
cantoned at Morar, with a detachment of
three companies to garrison the fortress,
it really has some considerable strength.
The fact that the fortress is thus held
within six miles of the cantonment is, of
course, an important element of strength.
Nor is this position at all remote from
support. There is the force at Agra within
75 miles distance, and the European
cavalry at Muttra in the neighbourhood
of Agra. If the strictest consideration
were given to possible contingencies, fault
might he found with the sufficiency of our
strength at Gwalior. Similar fault might
in that way be found with other stations
in India, perhaps even with our military
occupation of India generally. But look
ing to the necessities and the circumstances
of our situation in a country like India,
I do not see that our occupation of Gwalior
can be absolutely termed weak. Item em
ber in g the proved prowess of our troops
against any Indian enemies that could be
arrayed against us; the important or
decisive effects so often produced in 1857-
58 by the presence of a single European