الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎٩‎٧] (٣٢/١١)

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regiment with, one or two batteries of
European artillery; the self-sustaining
power of even a few European soldiers in
any fortified post,—I cannot doubt that the
Morar force would, if well commanded
and managed, certainly hold its own
against any surprise or assault that could
be made against it at Gwalior, and would
probably quell any disturbance that might
arise at Sindiah’s head quarters. But if
such disturbances became so protracted and
widespread that a single British brigade
could not cope with it, then the Morar
force would certainly hold its own till sup
port arrived from the direction of Hindos-
tan. I clearly believe that in such cir
cumstances our position would be better if
we had maintained our position at Morar,
than if we had abandoned it as now
proposed.
16. Of course if would be quite prac
ticable to strengthen the Morar force.
To that, however, there are the objections
that expense would be incurrred in con
struction of extra accommodation, and that
Morar is not favorable to the health of
European troops. Eor these reasons I
would avoid adding to the force, if possible.
Still if it were absolutely necessary to
strengthen Morar, I would recommend
this, notwithstanding the expense and the
unfavorable character of the climate ; con
sidering that these sacrifices and risks
must be incurred where imperative mili
tary and political considerations are in
volved.
17. One mode of strengthening Morar
obviously suggests itself. A railway might
be made thither from Agra at no exces
sive cost, especially as the Jumna is to be
bridged, under any circumstances, for
other railway lines. If additional outlay
is to be incurred for the sake of Morar,
this is the best mode of applying it. If
additional accommodation for troops were
provided at Morar, that expense would
yield no benefit beyond strengthening
Morar. But a railway, besides strengthen
ing Morar, would also improve the
country, and would yield some return.
In this case the capital for construction
would have to be furnished by the
British Government, and we have a
right to construct the line, even within
Sindiah’s territory. But it is urged
that if we abandon Morar, Sindiah
will himself supply the capital. This
would be so far well. But then the
line would not, under those circumstances,