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الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٣٢/١٩)

هذه المادة جزء من

محتويات السجل: مادة واحدة (١٦ ورقة). يعود تاريخه إلى ١٨٧١. اللغة أو اللغات المستخدمة: الإنجليزية. النسخة الأصلية محفوظة في المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وثائق جُمعت بصفة شخصية. وسجلات من مكتب الهند إدارة الحكومة البريطانية التي كانت الحكومة في الهند ترفع إليها تقاريرها بين عامي ١٨٥٨ و١٩٤٧، حيث خلِفت مجلس إدارة شركة الهند الشرقية. .

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order, they would grow to an extent that would require an army for their com
plete reduction.
The great natural strength of the fortress of GAvalior, which Lord
Straithnairn describes as the Gibraltar of India, the strength of the whole posi
tion including the hills which embrace the Lushkur, and on which Scindiah’s
v army is constantly exercised, the large resources of the State arsenal and
treasury, as well as of the city itself, would afford the opportunity, in the time
required for the arrival of a British force, for insurgents to establish them
selves in so formidable a manner as to require a regular army for their dislodg-
ment.
The obligations of the British Government demand that the real interests
of Scindiah and the Gwalior State shall be regarded, and not merely the gratifi
cation of Scindiah himself on the point on which he has notoriously neither
judgment nor discretion.
The above remarks on the value and effects of the presence of the British
force at the capital of Gwalior embrace my views ; they appear to me to be
fraught with truth, and, if disregarded, with true prophecy.
If we disregard them, Scindiah will consider that we have retreated from the
policy of 1844, which put down the military power of Gwalior; we shall foster
a large military power in the very centre of our possessions, which will cause
alarm and uneasiness whenever the peace of India is disturbed seriously, and
paralyse a much larger force than it occupies at present.
Had the Maharatta army of Maharajpore been in existence when we
received the reverse at Chillianwala, our power would have been more rudely
shaken to its foundations than it was then—w r e may not have the warning time
that we had in 1844, or the decision of an Ellenborough to anticipate the
danger.
Much has been said of our obligations to Scindiah at the mutiny. Had his
conduct been otherwise than faithful to the British Government, he would have
been guilty of the basest ingratitude: he was protected in youth, his posses
sion fostered and kept in order and faithfully delivered to him when he came
of age; all that was required of him was that he should not do anything cal
culated to endanger the peace of India, and that he should maintain order in
his dominions, for which he was provided with ample means. Under the
guidance of a wise Minister, he adhered to the British Government! The real
friends of Scindiah, among his countrymen, w r ould have suggested doubts
whether his position would have been better under the supreme authority of
a restored Peishw T a, than as the friend of the British Government.
If the British force is removed, the more turbulent and ill-disposed of the
Maharattas about him, who hate the control of the British Government, will be
ever on the w r atch to stimulate Scindiah’s passion for military power, which he
will never be able to control. It has been seen that he was thoroughly aware
that, although not included in the treaty, it was clearly understood and com
municated to Gwalior that the massing ot all the troops at the capital was not
to be done, but yet they were so massed, and the three battalions of police that
were permitted for police duties, were enrolled as regiments.
The removal of the British subsidiary force will be certainly followed,
instead of a reduction of force, by a demand for more regiments to maintain
order in Scindiah’s territory.
With reference to the stipulations of the 36th paragraph of the despatch,
I would venture to observe that the hill for annual repair of the buildings
at Morar to he kept ready for any such force of British troops as could be sent
there, would he so heavy that it is very doubtful if that item would be fulhlled.
The return of a British force for coercion of the Gwalior army implies
a violation of engagements—it is not probable uuder such cncums ^ees a
they would he so good as to give us possession of the fort or o e i
is stated in the despatch to completely command it.

حول هذه المادة

الشكل والحيّز
مادة واحدة (١٦ ورقة)
لغة الكتابة
الإنجليزية بالأحرف اللاتينية
للاطّلاع على المعلومات الكاملة لهذا السجل

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الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٣٢/١٩)و المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندو IOR/L/PS/5/268, ff 92-107و مكتبة قطر الرقمية <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100089599244.0x000009> [تم الوصول إليها في ٢٨ March ٢٠٢٤]

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