الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎١‎٠‎٤] (٣٢/٢٥)

S3
*
( 3 )
The construction of a Kailway out of
Imperial Kevenues is at present impos
sible, and would only partially effect the
object in view.
I see nothing in the recommendations
here that will in any way lead to a con
sideration of the position of the force
either at Hyderabad or Mhow.
The position of both these forces is
essentially different, and the return to a
policy which always existed before 1864
with regard to Scindia cannot be quoted
as an argument in favor of a reversal of a
policy which in the case of Hyderabad
and Mhow has existed since 1766 and
1818 respectively.
Apprehensions are expressed in these
dissents that disturbances might arise at
Gwalior, and that the power of the Maha
rajah would be shaken by the with
drawal of our troops. If any of the old
evils should re-appear or even seem
probable, if Scindia’s Army evinced
a mutinous spirit, or the population
of the Lushkur showed symptoms of
turbulence, the article in the new treaty
would provide for the immediate re-occu
pation of the Cantonment and the Fort,
and a recurrence to the present state of
things ; and as the evacuation of the Fort
and Cantonment would not take place
until the Kailway is finished, this could be
effected in eight and forty hours.
The result of such an occurrence vmuld
inevitably be the immediate and complete
disbandment and extinction for ever of
Scindia’s Army. No one feels more deeply
than I do the inconvenience and danger
caused by the existence of Scindia s Army.
If this proposal fails, all hope of reduction
during the Maharajahs life-time is at an
end.
I will not argue further as to whether our
honor is wholly untarnished in this matter.
No refinement, no colouring or explanation,
no qualification or reference to motives of