ملف ١٣٥٥\ ١٩١٧ الجزء ١ "التسوية السلمية - اتفاقية تجارة الأسلحة لسنة ١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٨‎٣] (٦٠٠/٥٧١)

situation at Jibuti in relation to the arms traffic, the following extracts may
be quoted from a memorandum by the Hritisli Minister at Adis Ababa
(Mr. Thesiger) dated the Kith March J916 :—
“Jibuti is the key to the whole political situation, not only in Abyssinia
but in Somaliland and on the southern and Soudan frontiers. So
long as it is held by the French, who have no territorial interests in
the hinterland to be affected, it will be used mainly as an arms depot
from which to Hood the interior with rides and ammunition. . .
The French have acted, and will, I think, continue to act, loyally
towards us in prohibiting the import of arms into Abyssinia during
the war, but . . . the moment peace is declared, the existing
prohibition will be raised, and the trade in arms will recommence on
a scale such as we have never known before, and we shall be as
powerless to stop it in the future as we were in the past. . . . The
trade interest in France and the Jibuti merchants, who have been
starved out during the period of the war, not to speak of the French
Somaliland authorities, whose revenues depend for their surplus
entirely on this traffic, will clamour to be allowed to make up for
the bad times they have gone through, and the French Government
will, as before, be unable to resist this joint influence. Experience
has shown that the French Legation [at Adis Ababa] always resort to
a deal in rifles when in any difficulty. . . . We must therefore
anticipate in the near future an enormous influx of rifles and
ammunition into Abyssinia, the effects of which will be felt on all our
borders. The seriousness of this prospect cannot be disguised.
. . . The suspension of permits to import arms offers the only means
of bringing pressure to bear upon Abyssinia, and this instrument is
in the sole hands of France, who, although she has frequently used it
for her own ends, will never surrender or utilise it for the common
good, and, indeed, could not do so for any length of time without
seriously damaging her commercial interests in Jibuti, which depend
on this traffic, and her railway returns, which profit largely thereby ;
and it must not be forgotten that it is on the combined prosperity of
these two institutions that her policy in Abyssinia is based ....
France .... is not exposed to the same risk [as Italy and
Great Britain], as 1 honestly believe that if any serious incident arose
which touched her solely, an incident, that is, of such gravity that if
Great Britain or Italy were concerned they would be forced to send
an ultimatum, she could, and would, enforce reparation by the simple
expedient of closing Jibuti to the import of arms until satisfaction
were granted. It is therefore evident that, while this traffic in arms
is a serious impediment to any hope of reform in this country
f 1 . 0 ., Abyssinia], as well as a grave danger, not only to the neigh-
bouiing British and Italian territories, but also to Abyssinia herself,
it is and will always remain for France, not only a source of immense
pmfit, but a safe insurance policy against many possible contingencies.
We can therefore, I consider, neither hope to accomplish any amelio-
lation in the condition of Abyssinia, or succeed in arresting the
piogiess of illicit dealing in arms until h reneh influence is eliminated
in this country, and this can only be accomplished by exchanging
french Somaliland for territory elsewhere . . .
1. 1 he SAb-Committee adhered to the view that the ideal solution would
be the cession of f lench Somaliland to Great Britain. They fully appreciated
t e difficulty of reconciling the French Government to an arrangement
which—
(1) would involve not only the surrender of French territory, but also the
saciifice of French interests in the Harrar district and in Abvssinia
generally ;
(_) would deprive them of an important coaling station ; and
(3) would cause the virtual disappearance of French influence from the
Bed Sea.