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Printed copies of letters from Sir Henry Willock to successive British Foreign Secretaries discussing the situation in Persia. [4r] (7/14)
The record is made up of 1 file (7 folios). It was created in 01 Dec 1838-04 Sep 1841. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
r 7 )
Indly. —The commercial relations between the two countries, which from their mngnitude
are very important, will be entirely deranged. The Persians deprived of their usual supplies
from England will once more return to the manufactured goods of Russia ; and our own
merchants, alarmed by such repeated interruptions to the trade, will be weary of speculating
at a market which is found subject to so many contingencies.
Zrdly. —Persia will very soon discover that we have not the power to injure her; and so
long as she is coaxed and cherished by Russia, she has no immediate occasion for our alliance.
We shall therefore be more anxious to rtsume our lost footing at Tehran, than the Shah will
be to invite our return.
If force is to supply the place of conciliation, I should next wish to consider in what
manner England has the power of compelling Persia to more social feelings. I have elsewhere
observed that compulsion cannot with safety be resorted to; because the first consequence of
weakening the Shah is more completely to render him a tool of Russia—if this view is sound,
further enquiry is unnecessary, but as it may not generally be conceded, I will touch on the
two points by which Persia may be supposed to be accessible and vulnerable.
Is it by invasion ? All who have been in the country know the impracticability of the
passes which separate Dashtestan from the interior Provinces; and if these difficulties did not
exist, the poverty of the country, and the paucity of supply, for an invading army, would
discourage such an enterprise.
Is it by the unprofitable policy of setting up another Prince?—of creating a revolution?
—of disturbing a Government which is not oppressive, and which is not more unpopular than
would be any other we could raise in its place? Such projects might possibly be hazarded if
Persia were unprotected—backed as she is by Russia, they cannot for a moment be entertained.
Situated as we are at the present moment in Asia, encompassed by so many dangers,
warnings, and threatenings, it is impossible to act on all points with vigor, nor is it politic
to threaten where we have not the power of execution.
With the Shah of Persia it may be expedient to temporize. He has been mortified,—-he
has also strong ground for irritation in the occupation of Karrack,—that he has displayed
energy no person can question; that his obstinacy and pertinacity of purpose have disturbed
the peace of Asia, and involved us in great embarrassment, is undeniable. But circumstances
have developed in his character qualities which may render him formidable as an enemy, useful
as an ally, and he has redeeming virtues which, if properly directed, may lead him to the
steadfast upholding of the independence of the Persian Empire; and such an instrument,
at such an epoch, should be handled and moulded to our purpose.
We shall not lose in dignity by now conciliating Mahomed Shah, nor is it desirable to
try him too much by demanding that which his pride may have difficulty in conceding, nor in
resisting any concession which he may have a right to demand.
We cannot injure the Shah of Persia ; he may do us incalculable mischief by disturbing
our contemplated operations in Afghanistan, which I pray may still be cancelled, for I confess
that I cannot contemplate without awe and dread the labyrinth of political intricacies, and
military difficulties into which we are immersing; the calling into action the hostile feelings
of myriads of brave warriors west of the Indus; whilst we leave in India elements of disor
ganization which are strongly developing, even before the departure of our Army, which is our
only safeguard; and I do not regard as the least evil of the growing system, the annihilation
in the breast of the Shah of Persia of all expectation in the alliance of Great Britain.
(Signed) HENRY WILLOCK.
"S
About this item
- Content
The printed copies of the letters have been brought together as a booklet giving Sir Henry Willock's thoughts on the situation in Persia from December 1838 to September 1841. Sir Henry Willock had spent 23 years in Persia, 11 of which had been spent superintending British relations with the Court of Persia. The letters that comprise the booklet are as follows:
- Letter to The Right Honorable The Lord Viscount Palmerston, 01 December 1838, outlining the background politics in Persia and in particular with regards to the Kings Of Persias ambitions over the last 30 years to conquer Herat, the view the British Government had taken to such attempts and amibitions in the past and the views of the Sovereign who had mostly recently attempted to annex it. The letter goes on to discuss the line of policy which should now be applied to Persia, particularly in light of the British Government's occupation of the island of Karrack, and Sir Henry Willock's belief that the British now needed to regain the confidence of Persia and should unconditionally retreat from the island. The letter also discusses Russia current aims and intentions with regards to Afghanistan, its own empire, trade with India and the need for the British to check its progress. There is also speculation by Sir Henry as to the British Government's intentions of removing Dost Mohammad Khan from power owing to his decision to ally with the Persians in order to remove a rival from power; thoughts on the difficulties of marching Indian troops through Afghanistan and his opinions on the Shah's rival Runjeet Singh and his conclusions that the safest move for Great Britain is to adhere to its alliance with Persia.
- Memorandum to The Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston, Secretary of State, 4 Feburary 1839 offering his opinions on the effects that the British Mission leaving the Court of Persia would have. The memorandum focuses on the disadvantages of this action including leaving Persia open to occupation by Russia; enabling the Shah to occupy Herat; damaging commercial relations between the two countries; the likelihood of Persia discovering Britain does not have the means to cause injury and cautioning that invasion of Persia would be impractical owing to the difficulty in traversing the passes into the country.
- Memorandum to The Right Honourable The Earl of Aberdeen, Secretary of State, 04 September 1841 regarding his recommendations from 1838 to Viscount Palmerston of maintaining the Persian alliance and abandoning the subjection of Aghanistan and his letter of 1839 following the withdrawal of the British Mission from the Court of Persia and other private remarks since which he has made to the Right Honorable Henry Ellis. The memorandum outlines Willock's opposition to the opinions of Lord Auckland and the intention to place Shah Shuja on the throne at Cabul; his dislike of the news that a secret committee Pre-1784, the Committee responsible for protecting East India Company shipping. Post-1784, its main role was to transmit communications between the Board of Control and the Company's Indian governments on matters requiring secrecy. had taken this decision without consulting the East India Company Board of Directors and his belief that the British's best approach in Persia is to avoid collision and to avoid recommendations eminating from the Court of St. Petersburgh. Willock goes on to consider the benefits of a neutral Afghanistan permitted to remain independent which he views as having been the best solution that the British Government threw out; comparing the British position in Afghanistan to the French position in Algeria; considering the potential threats to Punjab of viewing Herat as an enemy; the risk of war with Russia; the need to ensure secession is not regarded as an evil of great magnitude; financial difficulties in India; the cost of war in Afghanistan and the need to retreat from the island of Karrack if friendly relations with Persia are to be restored. Towards the end of the memorandum Willock diverges from Persia to discuss the port of Aden which he believes is only useful as a coal depot and that it should be given up as a way of saving money.
- Extent and format
- 1 file (7 folios)
- Arrangement
The copies of letters have been printed in the booklet in date order.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: The file has been foliated in the front top right hand corner of each folio with a pencil number enclosed with a circle.
The file also contains original pagination 2-13 which starts on the verso The back of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'v'. of the first folio and concludes on the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of the final folio.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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Printed copies of letters from Sir Henry Willock to successive British Foreign Secretaries discussing the situation in Persia. [4r] (7/14), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F126/18, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023190383.0x000008> [accessed 29 April 2024]
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Copyright: How to use this content
- Reference
- Mss Eur F126/18
- Title
- Printed copies of letters from Sir Henry Willock to successive British Foreign Secretaries discussing the situation in Persia.
- Pages
- 1r:7v
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence