'Report from Lieut-General Sir P. H. N. Lake K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commanding I.E.F. "D" on the Defence of Kut-Al-Amarah under Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., 3 December 1915-29 April 1916' [‎13v] (26/44)

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Paragraph 5.—If retreat of enemy affords opportunity to continue advance
the two steamers which you are authorised to retain vide paragraph
2 will permit of your taking forward supplies by relays and also of
passing troops from one bank to another.
Paragraph 0, —Unless line of action directed above involves grave difficul
ties which are not apparent to me here, take immediate steps to
carry it into effect since any delay will not only postpone date of
arrival of reinforcements but will gravely imperil the supply
question.
Addressed Corps, repeated 6th Division, both acknowledge."
APPENDIX Q.
Copy of a telegram from General Townshend to Corps Commander and G. H. Q., No. 69-
112-G., dated 23rd January 1916.
" Reply to 13-205-G.
The events of the past few days require me now to face the situation from
the point of view of my command. Co you consider that two
brigades of infantry and one battery are sufficient reinforcements
to enable you to join hands with me at Kut. If there is doubt I
had better be told at once as 1 have to make up my mind to do
one of three things.
(a) To attempt to break out as you suggest In your 11-132-G., and 11-
133-G., ot January 17th. 1 should make straight for Shaikh Saad
by the desert route 25 miles and would ask you to send a column
to meet me more than halfway if possible. Between January 28th
and February 3rd moderate conditions will enable me to get about
4,000 able-bodied men there mostly commissariat, engineers, sap
pers, gunners, signal, flying men, British infantry, Indian infan
try and Indian cavalry, proportion of medical personnel; wounded,
sick, weakly men and those unable to march, followers, etc , left
behind giving sufficient guard for wounded in hospital all under
a brigade commander, one who could make terms with the enemy.
All guns would be destroyed. Samana with two barges to communi
cate run gauntlet and your Senior Naval Officer could assist her
through if she require it. We should carry 200 rounds great coat
and two days food on back.
(^) It is probable if Kut falls the enemy will be able to take active mea
sures against you and you will get surrounded or turned by the
Pusht i-Kuh for example, but enemy cannot take offensive against
you in reality until they can get reinforcements through here I
think. Would (you) prefer that 1 should defend Kut step by step
until no ammunition remains on the Saragossa principle so as to
give you time to make British position a strong one at Amarah and
Nasiriyah.
In conversation with Chief I said It was a mistake to go north of Amarah
with the force we had in Mesopotamia and when Sir John Nixon
informed me that 1 was to advance on Ctesiphon and Baghdad with
my one division I considered it my duty to write officially and point
out great risk of such a step asking for a Corps or at least
two divisions to do it. Having done so I had done my duty and
had to carry out my orders and make my plans to the best of
my ability as I had done in the advance from Amarah against
Kut. To my mind I was certain that as soon as we dropped the
offensive in Dardanelles we should quickly feel the effect in the
secondary field of Mesopotamia and I believe Turks are now
making Mesopotamia the principal field in which they are sending
their maximum forces. Had 1 been given two divisions and got
into Baghdad we should not have got out again. If you are not
strong enough to join hands with me here I do not believe you will
be able to remain where you are.