'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎32v] (69/424)

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bearings for the night march), for fear of giving away the direction of the
intended attack.
The complete breakdown of signal communication was a very serious
landicap during the battle. As we have seen, from 1300 onwards
General Townshend was completely out of touch with his main force.
He did not know the state of affairs until the evening, when Major Reilly,
the R. F. C. flight commander, returned from General Delamain's H. Q.
This officer had been able to land near General Delamain about 1600
and was able to inform General Townshend of the situation.
The amount of cable, which accompanied Column A, would, had
everything gone according to plan, have been sufficient to enable tele
phonic communication to be maintained throughout the day. But, in
war, one should always be prepared for the unexpected. It certainly
seems strange that one of the pack wireless sets should not have been
allocated to Column A.
Column A consisted of frds of the infantry of the division, 3 out of 4
mobile batteries with the force, and the Cavalry. Its organization was
as follows :—
Brigadier-General Hoghton commanded the assaulting column and
lad his own Brigade, the 17th, directly under his command. Colonel
Mac-George, 117th Mahrattas, commanded the 2 battalions of the 16th
Brigade under General Hoghton. General Delamain had directly under
his command the remaining 2 battalions of his Brigade, the 16th.
No member of the divisional staff accompanied Column A. The
position of General Townshend and his headquarters seems to have been
faulty. Situated where he was, on the river bank, he could exercise no
real personal control over the main operation. This he entrusted to a
subordinate, who was allotted no extra staff, although in executive
■command of the greater portion of the Force. It would appear better
for General Townshend to have had his headquarters with and to have
been actually in control of his main operations.
Had this been the case, it is unlikely that General Hoghton's force
would have been permitted to go round the Ataba marsh.
The staff work prior to the operations was good. When Column A
bivouacked for the night, the staff work was not good and there was
great confusion and chaos. Extra staff officers might perhaps have
helped to reduce this chaos.
When Column A arrived at the point, some 2 miles from the river,
wheie they actually bivouacked, it was 1745 and'was so dark that
men could only see 300 or 400 yards. The column settled down in line,
sentry groups being pushed out a little ahead. There were no proper
outposts. There was no depth. There was little or no organization.
The only orders that battalions received were to bivouac on a certain
portion of the general line.