'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎59v] (123/424)

9S
practicable, could be stretched out until the arrangements for the relief
Jiad been fully completed.
It is true that it the British made an immediate advance thev might
be able to engage and defeat the enemy before the arrival of the body
-of 8,000 men' that was said to have marched eastwards from Kut-al-
Amara on the 5th January. But the later experience of the war had
tended to show that such rapid victory was no longer to be expected ;
and it might be concluded, therefore, that the Turks would probably be
able to complete their concentration before the British gained a definite
advantage vn a battle fought on the 6th January. The force that had
been confided to General Aylmer was, as has been observed, still some
what raw. Only one of the infantry brigades, the 35th from India, was
composed of the units of which it had originally been formed or possessed
its proper staff, the commanders were without intimate knowledge of
each other's respective characteristics, and the troops were not acquainted
with their leaders. The signal and other services had been improvised.
It was desirable, therefore, to proceed with caution and to take every
possible measure requisite for the attainment of success. It seems, then,
that the cause of the British would have been better served had General
Aylmer at least concentrated at the Musandaq reach on the 6th the whole
of the troops now available, and subsequently undertaken a careful recon
naissance of the enemy's position before fixing a plan of action. The
Turks would certainly be allowed more time in which to throw up en
trenchments, but it was all to the good that they should have advanced
so far to meet the British ; for serious trouble must soon be experienced
in providing for the maintenance of the enemy's forces at so great a
^distance from their advanced base at Shumran, and an opportunity
might then occur of attacking them in difficulties.
Prior to the receipt of the latest of the instructions from Sir Fenton
Aylmer, General Younghusband had decided on the course of action to
be followed by his troops on the 6th. He contemplated that the first
echelon should march to Shaikh Saad, and his plan of action was to
threaten the enemy's left and at the same time to envelop and drive the
forces that were on the right bank of the Tigris into the angle which is
formed by its course at Shaikh Saad. It was hoped, further, that a
successful advance on the right bank would subsequently enable the
British to enfilade the enemy's positions on the left bank of the river,
and so render them untenable. After explaining his intentions to the
commanders of brigades. Sir George issued orders that the British force
was to advance on Shaikh Saad at 0830 on the 6th January. On
the right bank, under General Kemball, who had been transferred
from the staff to an executive command, there would be the 28th
Infantry Brigade, comprising the 2nd Leicestershires, 51st and 53rd
Sikhs and 56th Punjabi Eifles, one troop from the Cavalry Brigade, the