'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎84r] (172/424)

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Tigris in the areas opposite to Ora, very mucli in the positions tLat
had been held on the 14th ; but a detachment on the right bank con
sisting of the 1-lst Gurkhas, the 93rd, two guns of the 23rd Mountain
Battery and one squadron of the 33rd Cavalry secured the shipping and
camps from Arab sharp-shooters.
During the 15th January a couple of telegrams were sent to General
Headquarters, and repeated to General Townshend, describing the
•situation at the front. In the first Aylmer observed that the reports
irom Townshend indicated clearly that the Turks intended to delay the
British in the long Hanna-Sannaiyat defile. They would then probably
'bring a large force down the right bank for the purpose of fighting a
tattle at Es Sinn, or further down the river, and severing the commu-
mications of the British with Basra. In order that the Tigris Corjs
?might be in a position to meet the enemy on the right bank a bridge was
'made over the Tigris, and when completed all troops, except those be
longing to the 7th Division (commanded by General Younghusband)
would be moved over the river. In the second message the number
^of casualties (1,613) that had been experienced at the battle of
Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , and the disabling of the gun-boat Gadfly by a shell, were men-
Itioned.
This statement did not apparently satisfy General Townshend, for
lie telegraphed on the 16th that the guns which had been seen were four
r quick-firers, six 16-pounders and two others, and also furnished a list
'•©f their wagons. The presence of stragglers and wounded, it was pointed
€ut, gave the troops the appearance of a defeated, not a manoeuvring,
force. The losses of the enemy, also, could, he said, not have been
less than those of the British, and it was entirely foreign to the nature
of the Turk, or to that of the troops of any other nation, to march 27
imiles in retreat and then cross a river for the purpose of fighting again,
Finally the opinion was hazarded that the enemy's units had not been
iferried from the right to the left bank of the Tigris after the battle of
Shaikh Saad and that the 6 battalions which had opposed Kemball's
:28th Brigade in this battle were still south of the river. It was
suggested, in addition, that operations along the right bank of the
Tigris afforded a better chance of victory than did those on the left
tank.
Before this some plain speaking had also been taking place between
Kut-al-Amara and the Tigris Corps on the wireless. At 2100 on the
15th January a message had been received from General Townshecd
who expressed hiimaself as deeply concerned that no news of the move-
:inents of the relieving force had reached Kut-al-Amara siuce 1135
on the 14th. The 15th January had been reached, and this was the
•date beyond which Aylmer had himself stated that it would be hazardous
^o expect the garrison to hold out. Townshend then complained that