'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎123r] (250/424)

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behind its starting point. One battalion, however, maintains direc
tion and captured the trench and a number of prisoners. Between
the captured trench and the river some good infiltration work was done
by the 8th Brigade who pushed their line forward by means of patrols,
making an advance of about half a mile and securing over 40 prisoners m
the process. . .
In the teeth of great difficulties of movement and communication,
preparations were pushed on for the assault on Bait Isa on the ITt
at dawn. The plan was to assault Bait Isa
1^4 iqifi with the 3rd Division. The 13th Division was
then to relieve the 3rd and keep control over the
water cuts, whilst the 3rd Division moved back, marched south and then
west, and seized the trenches near Dujaila. These movements seem
unnecessarily complicated, nor were the movements preliminary to
the attack less devoid of complexity. It is unnecessary to go into them
in detail here but a great deal of counter marching was involved both
on the right and left flanks, all of which had to be done at night by troops
who had been busily engaged and involved in great discomfort and con
tinuous fighting, and who therefore were far from fresh at the hour of
the assault. However, less confusion arose than might have been ex
pected from a study of the orders, and by the early hours of the 17th
the 8th Brigade had arrived from the right flank and was holding the
trench captured on the 15th, whilst the 7th and 9th Brigades were formed
up on its right, i .e., north, preparatory to the assault. The 7th Brigade
on the right and the 9th Brigade on the left, each on a frontage of 300
yards, moved to the assault at dawn on the 17th. They had a 1,000
yards to cover and there was a slight mist. The troops actually caught
up the barrage and bayoneted the Turks, whom they found sitting under
the parapet of their own front line, before the barrage lifted. The assault
was wholly successful and a considerable number of prisoners were taken,
the mouths of all the canals were seized and trenches further east cap
tured, both along the river bank and on the left front. In the latter
locality, the troops pushed far beyond their allotted objectives and seized
two guns, which however they were unable to get away. This resulted
in our left flank being well forward in a sharp salient where it was quite
unsupported. It may be surmised, moreover, that men who had already
had a long period of very hard work, who had been out the whole of the
previous night, who knew that they were to be relieved that evening
and that they had in front of them another long night march, probably
tried to get as much rest as possible during the day, and that therefore
consolidation may have been of a somewhat perfunctory nature.
On the Turkish side, it is evident that Khalil realized that the battle
had reached a critical stage, and that our possession of Bait Isa, gave
us freedom of manoeuvre on the right bank, and he determined to make