'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎140r] (284/424)

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had only three issues, and later their refusal to eat horseflesh sapped
their strength. The British troops had the advantage of a convalescent
depot which was formed for them, and a soup made from animal bones
and issued from March 4th was.much appreciated.
On April the 9th the meal ration was cut down to 5 ozs. to last till'
the 21st and on the 22nd a further cut was made to 4 ozs. On the 15th
the greater part of the Arab population had to be fed, and it was pro
posed to drop food into Kut by air. 5,000 lbs. would give a 6 oz. ration
to :—
British 2,970, Indians 10,870 and Arabs 3,700.
On April 15th 3,350 lbs. were dropped, on the 16th 1,333 lbs, on the
17th only 400 lbs. and from the 18th the weather was too stormy for
flying. One plan remained as a forlorn hope. A river steamer, the
Julnar, tried to run the gauntlet at 2000 on the 26tlL But it was
overcome by the Turks at Maqasis.
On the 29th Kut surrendered with an emergency ration theoretically
still in hand to consume on that day.
Two lessons of this siege stand out above all others,
Firstly, the importance of the food supply. " Economy of force,^
and u the employment of the principal mass," at the decisive point
are principles again and again emphasized in u My Campaign in Meso
potamia." But the commander of the relieving force could not exploit
these principles because he did not know when was the decisive time "
i.e., the duration of Kut rations. In December General Aylmer judged
it to be January 15th. By February Kut, in itself, did not exercise
much influence on time for all practical purposes, at any rate in the
near future.
During the whole of the first phase, the troops were on something
near a full ration and at no time was any distribution of food made
on a sensible or reasonable scientific basis. Common sense dictates
that supplies are of the first consideration in a siege. In the siege
of Kut supply arrangements were neglected till it was too late. " Defeat
is impossible," was the thought of the troops. 44 Relief is a certainty "
was the thought of the commander. 44 At least the relieving force will
hack its way through eventually in the good old British way " was the
thought of all. One main reason why Kut fell was because neither
the commander inside nor the one at the Base seemed to realise that
victory, or relief depended in the last resort on the full stomachs of
the troops.
Secondly, the passivity of the defence. It has been shown how
topographical 'features made a sortie- very difficult, though on March
8th there was a strong probability of successful co-operation with the
relieving force. As a rule the Turks had a whole division round Kut
almost entirely on the north bank, with a varying reserve at Shumran