'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎157v] (319/424)

CHAPTER XX.
Cleneral Maude's Offensive. I.—The Clearing of the Right Bank.
Period 18th August 1916—16th February 1917.
'This period falls into seven phases :—
(1) Preliminary preparations—18tli August—12tli December.
(2) The advance to the Hai—13th December—16th December.
(3) The first attempt to bridge the Tigris—17th December—21st
December.
<4) Consolidation on the Hai and preparations to clear the right
bank of the Tigris—22nd December—6th January .
'(5) Clearing the Khadairi Bend—7th January—19th January.
^(6) Capture of the Hai triangle—20th January—5th February.
(7) Clearing the Dahra Bend—6th February—16th February.
N.B. —All map raferencss are to map3 13 to 19.
Phase I.
{28th August—12th December).
This phase has been dealt with in Chapter XY. It has been shown
that throughout the summer and autumn General Maude and his subordi
nates, backed by the whole-hearted support of the War Office, had applied
themselves to the regeneration of the force and particularly to x>]ie esta
blishment of sound administration and an adequate Line of Communica
tion. By the end of October the administrative situation was such that
the C.-in-C. felt justified in moving his G. H. Q. up to the front at Arab
Village, and on December 12th he was able to telegraph to London and
to Simla that his concentration on the Tigris front was complete.
In order to frustrate the Turkish designs, to protect India, to regain
our prestige and to utilize the large forces that were now assembled in
the Eastern Theatre, General Maude had determined to assume the
^offensive at the earliest possible moment and before the breaking of the
winter rains.
When the great superiority of the British Forces is considered the
rinducements to attack and wipe out the slur of the Kut disaster are
■ evident. The decision to do so lies to the credit of General Maude
personally, for the mission of I. E. F. 'D' as laid down by H. M. Govern-
rment in September had about it a distinctly defensive tenour as had the
. covering letter from the C. I. G. S
From the point of view of grand strategy, the question as to the rights
rand wrongs of committing so large a force to a secondary theatre, is
.outside the scope of this chapter.
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