'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎178r] (360/424)

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On the left bank, by sinking boats and damming the Diyala about
20 miles up stream, it is said that a great deal of the country east of
the Diyala and Tigris can be inundated and thus a turning movement
from the east or north-east prevented.
These inundations would have taken the best part of a week to make
a good obstacle, but if Khalil had decided at once on this course he would
have had time.
He would then only have had to watch the line of the Diyala for
some 14 miles, while on the right bank he could have held a line
from Tel Aswad—Tigris with a main position in rear which, with the
help of the Khar Canal, could have watched from Umm -at-Tabul to
Tel Ataf right up to Lake Aqarquf, thus effectually guarding its right.
Both of these positions would have been well protected by the
inundations.
The Khar Canal is a good obstacle 25 yards wide, 30 feet deep, with-
steep banks.
No concerted plan was adopted. When Karabekir Bey returned
from Aziziya against orders, he was told to prepare a defensive position
at Ctesiphon, while the 14th Division that had now arrived prepared-
the line of the Diyala with a supporting position in rear from Tel
Mahomed to Qarara.
Khalil neglected the right bank for the left because he wished to keep
communications open with the XIII Corps, hoping that it might arrive
from Persia in time.
A short defensive position was begun on the right bank from the
Tigris to Umm-at-Tabul, with local labour.
Khalil then changed his mind and decided to hold the Diyala and
a much longer line from the Tigris to Tel Aswad on the right bank.
Accordingly the Umm-at-Tabul fortifications were abandoned and
some three miles of trench started near Tel Aswad.
When Karabekir Bey returned and was shown what he was to hold
with the 52nd Division numbering some 2,300 men, he told the Army
Commander that his force was insufficient to take up such a long line.
He pointed out that the enemy could easily pin him down on the
Diyala, transfer the bulk of their forces to the right bank and occupy
Baghdad from the west. Hence the right bank was the dangerous
one and it would be better to hold the shorter Umm-at-Tabul line.
Accordingly work on the Tel Aswad position was abandoned and.
recommenced at Umm-at-Tabul. By now it was too late as our forces
were on the Diyala and neither position was complete.
In Persia the Russians started to follow up the rear-guard of the
XIII Corps on March 3rd, west of Kirmanshah. The C. I. Gr. S. told.
General Maude that the Grand Duke had ordered Baratoff to push on
to Khanikin. He thought that the 6th Turkish Division might escape,.