'Muscat-Omani relations' [‎109r] (227/412)

province of Dhofar. Y^hen he first visited Dhofar shortly after his
'accession, disorder was rife and this authority of his Government did
not extend much beyond the coastal strip between Raisut and I orbat.
Now his effective influence covers the entire inhabited coastal and
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rate. The Shaikhs of the Qara and Kathir recognise his authority
Wall in his absence.
7. I do not imagine that -the Sultan 's idea of British Forces es-
tablis" hi i s __e :■ l cl-o I.uler o: C lan (and probably having tcj^ain-
tain him in tl at position) is one that wo-ild con end itself to either
His Ivlajesty 's Govern ment or to the Government of India - unless stra-
•
examination of the proposal for a protectorate first made in 1890.
Assuming that no such radical change in our attitude of non-interference
■. ith the interior cr-i be conter.plated, it would, I su.7 jest, be unv/ise
for us to associate ourselves directl; v.ith the Sultc-n's aims and
thereby incur responsibilities woch Vve are not prepared to carry
out to the full.- Cur general policy should, I submit, continue to be
one of strengthening 'the authority of the Sultan while making ?'t clear
that the extension of his influence mst be at his responsibility and
achieved by his own exertions. My own view is that the attitude 01
the Ghaf^ri Shaikh is one more example of the Arab's eye being "'ixed
unflir#:nfly in the main cl nee". The healthy condition of tl e State
Treasury is alreac be ;innin " to exert a strong centripetal force,
against wl ich the Imam las no effective counter measure, and given the
necessary materials to discourage Hin£wi opposition, the Sultan would
probably hrve little difficulty in re-establishing himself. By action
on his ovn initiative and * : : thout direct support from outside, ^ e would
not only enhance his oi.n reputation amongst the tribes, but would also
u
given facilities for aco;uiring additional arms anc equipment in reason
able quantities. At'the end of the war lar e stocks of surplus mili
tary stores will . ssuma 1 ly become available and it r :ii it : en be pos
sible to make a presentati on to him of a number Oj . s.ric 11 lield guns
\/ith ammunition and perhaps mortars. This su gestiorl will rorm tlio
subject of a separate reference link :d to the facilities he x ■ s given
to us during the war.
9. in any developments towards 0' an,- the position o, e r. .
Adviser, if one is aopo nted, would 1 t ink rei.ain una, j.eoted -s : e
would presumably occupy himself pr ncipaJ.ly wit: relations i.it. 1 ,
Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. and the administrative a^ic irs of the coastal ar^a.
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ponsibilities for internal security Q- d, the ^i-te S j cii oncoorag^o
to defend less on cur assistance ii. the adiiiinist-r;.ticn and co. . r- c . l .
its -ilit 'ry force. J v . v is half-brother, Saiyid 'riq, the Su
hi s a man who has just returned from e tensive training t
l ilitia a.nd thl'Giiao-ai Lev Cor s and whose services co-'ald probably be
most suitably utilised in this sphere.
10. It is relevant to observe in conclusion th.-t i. ti f ac-^xCG
tendered to the Sultan is unfavourable to his aims, he is li-el: to be
come a despondent and disinterested Tluler and to re ; re —. j - - ^
far - ritl unfortunate, if not serious, consequence 10 le v. • 2.
11. T shall be lad to receive our instructions in du^ cpvT^e
n
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Political .1 :ent, .iuac it.