'Naval Staff monographs (historical) vol 4 no 15 - Naval operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf' [‎49] (62/150)

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indicating an intention to carry out an important offensive
movement. 1 Accordingly on the 24th April Lord Crewe
telegraphed to the Viceroy as follows 2 : —
" With reference to Nixon's request for a cavalry brigade I
concur in your decision, 3 as, apart from the impossibility of complying, 4
the approach of the hot season renders despatch of more troops,
especially British, inadvisable.
" Nixon's demand implies intention on his part of important
offensive movement. I presume he clearly understands that Govern
ment will not sanction at this moment any advance beyond present
theatre of operations. We must confine ourselves during summer
to defence of Basra Yilayet and oil interest in Arabistan. If after
smashing enemy in Karun direction it is possible to advance to
Amara, with view to establishing an outpost which will control
tribesmen between there and Karun and so contribute to security of
pipe line, I should be prepared to accept such a proposal, provided it
is supported by you, but I deprecate any plan involving undue
extension and possible demands for reinforcements. Strategically,
our present position is a sound one, and at present we cannot afford
to take risks by unduly extending it. We must play a safe game in
Mesopotamia."
Meanwhile, General Kixon proceeded with his preparations.
On the same day (24th April 1915) that Lord Crewe telegraphed
to the Viceroy, urging caution. Major-General Townshend, who
had arrived from India two days previously, and had taken over
the command of the A lth Division, was directed by Sir John
Nixon to proceed at once to Qurna to reconnoitre the Turkish
position north of that place and to form a plan of attack. 5 Sir
John considered that he was strong enough to undertake the
operations against Amara without reinforcements. 6
The Admiralty at this time were anxious that the supply of
oil should not be interrupted again in the future.
" My Lords .... desire to urge the great importance
of keeping the line safeguarded in the future. The interrup
tion (viz., during the early part of the year) has already cost
the State a very considerable sum, and Admiralty contracts with
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company cover a large amount of
Admiralty requirements, besides the quantity which is being
redistilled for toluene. It is, therefore, considered of extreme
urgency that no other breakdown should be experienced." 7
Strategically, Amara was precisely the point, possession of
which would enable us to protect the pipe line. The Viceroy,
1 Sir John Nixon gave evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission
that he understood he had been sent to Mesopotamia to pursue a more
vigorous policy than his predecessor. (Mesopotamia Commission: Report.)
2 No. 1812. The text of this telegram is as given in " Mesopotamia
Expedition," p. 24, but the Mesopotamia Commission : Report, p. 17, gives a
slightly different version.
3 Viz., not to despatch one.
4 Owing to shortage of cavalry in India.
J Despatch No. 168, dated 26th June.
G Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23rd May 1915.
7 Admiralty Letter, 23rd May 1915.
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