File 3874/1908 'Railways:-Trans-Persian Railway.' [‎69r] (139/536)

do comp upon ns we shall he throwing upon our children, if not upon our
selves, the greatest military problem that has ever confronted the Government
of this country.” The figures in Appendix A show the largely increased forces
which Russia will he able to develop on the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India and
Afghanistan as soon as the proposed line is completed.
2. It is true that our present friendship with Russia renders improbable
any hostile act on her part against India, but that friendship cannot be regarded
as permanent. As late as 1909 Major-General Gruloff of the Russian
General Staff wrote : “ the struggle between Russia and Britain for political
supremacy in Persia has been postponed but not concluded”. It is from this
struggle that hostilities may ensue in future. The present entente therefore
does not warrant the abandonment of sane and vigilant precautions.
It will be seen then that the previous military policy of India has been
based upon maintaining its strategic isolation, so that attack becomes, if not
impossible, at all events so difficult and lengthy an operation as to involve very
great financial strain on the attacking power, and to ensure that before
decisive issue is joined, the whole military strength of the British Empire will
be available. L
3. While it is the duty of the General Staff to emphasize the great
strategic advantage of the natural barriers in the defence of India and tlio
consequent disadvantage of piercing this barrier at any point by a railway,
s tiH it is fully lealized that a through connection by railway from Europe to
India is a development of civilization which cannot be resisted permanently.
Iho advocates of the scheme lay stress on choosing an alignment l< for
which its importance for transit is its very first consideration, everv thing else
being secondary or auxiliary”. At the same time, while safeguarding Russia’s
strategic requirements they recognize that some alignments, e.g., the 5 construc
tion of a line from Merv to Meshed, “would be strategically rather dangerous
for the English”. They evidently therefore anticipate difficulties ou our part,
and, assuming that a line will ultimately be constructed, the problem
becomes one of rendering it as strategically innocuous to India as possible, by
finding some artificial obstacle which will in some measure take the place of
the natural barrier which it is proposed to pierce, so that the strain thrown
upon the military resources of the Empire in the event of foreign aggression
may be neither too sudden nor too severe for them to bear. In the opinion
of the General btaif such a substitute can only be found in making use of our
preponderating sea power, as a means of control of the proposed line and in
adequate fortification, at some distance from the frontier of India, of a naval
base through which the proposed line must run.
4. So far in this memorandum the problem has been considered solely
from the local point of view of the defence of India from aggression, hut
other factors of importance demand attention in connection with this aspect of
the case.
5. It has been a cardinal point of onr strategy to retain strategic control
of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . If any sea Power other than Great Britain should obtain
preponderance or even a secure base in the Gulf, it is clear that the problem
of the defence of Indian ports and the safety of transports bringing reinforce
ments from home would be at once made more difficult. A railway passin®
close to the littoral and under control of any other Power would afford that
Power claims to a port on the Gulf which will be hard to resist. From the
possession of a port to the formation of a fortified base will be a natural step.
6. Should Russia adhere “ to her usual policy of cautious absorption” by a
gradual occupation of the provinces of Herat and Afghan Turkestan, the
highest authorities are of opinion that we should be forced at some period or
other to adopt the Kabul-Kand ikar line in our plan of defence, and that action
to cause the invader to evacuate Afghanistan would have to be taken elsewhere.
Such action will be facilitated, if we can, by the selection of a suitable
alignment for this railway and the permanent exclusion of any possible
alternative alignment, cause Russia to expose to us a vulnerable point within
reach of our sea power.