Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎2r] (3/348)

[1179]
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
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Printed for the War Cabinet. November 1917.
SECRET.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY.
SOUND as is the general policy of combining diplomatic
advances with military pressure as a means of shortening the war,
and attractive as is the idea of making overtures to Turkey with a
view to a separate peace, I am myself convinced that the time has
not come for any such action on our part, and that at the present
juncture it would not only be attended with failure, but would
greatly diminish the chances of success later on.
For at least six months, since the dramatis 'personae were
Mr. Elkus and Mr. Morgenthau, we have heard of the Turkish
desire, believed to be personified in Talaat Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , to conclude a
separate peace with this country. None of these conversations
has resulted in anything. It is more than doubtful whether the
agents employed had any authority. Certainly the principals have
never appeared on the scene. No evidence has been adduced to show
that Talaat, even supposing his hostility to Enver to be authentic,
and his desire for peace genuine, has the power to effect a revolution,
or to overthrow Enver, or to carry the Young Turkey party with
him. Neither is there any evidence to justify the conclusion that
Turkey has at all modified her pan Turanian ambitions, which have
been greatly expanded since tne war began, or that she has been
sufficiently humbled to induce her to conclude the only sort of peace
that we should be in a position to offer.
For what would be the nature of such a peace ? We are appa
rently to leave her Constantinople, but to deny her the control of the
Straits (for, indeed, unless we did that we might as well have not
fought at all;; to agree to the abolition of the Capitulations, and
relieve her of a considerable portion, if not the whole, of her
financial obligations to Germany; to secure her in the possession of
- theidrigpial Ottoman dominions in Asia Minor (at the expense of
.our French anld Italian Allies), but to lop off* Syria, Palestine,
Arabia, and Mesopotamia, with such window-dressing arrangements
as may concesd the reality of the loss and humour her national
pride.
; Now, even supposing we were to negotiate upon such a basis,
■ -v which I do not myself think that we are in a position to do, is there
a reasonable' chance that Talaat or a majority of the ruling clique
at Constantinople—for it is not Talaat but only a Turkish Govern
ment that can conclude peace—would be prepared to accept such
terms ?
I am compelled to answer this question in the negative for two
reasons : (1) That the terms are not good enough ; (2) that whether
good or bad, the Turks are not physically in a position to entertain
them.
I do not think them good enough, because I have little doubt
that Germany can promise, and has promised, better. I should be
greatly surprised if she has not led the lurks to expect not merely
that she will recover the whole of Palestine and Baghdad for them,
as soon as she has completed the defeat of the Italian and Russian
armies, but Egypt and very likely Tripoli as well. Very probably
the islands have been thrown in also.
The physical conditions supply an even greater obstacle. How is