Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎48r] (95/348)

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The boundaries of Armenia on the north and east, that is between
Armenia and Georgia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, shall
be laid down by thie Supreme Council at the same time as those
between Armenia and Turkey, failing a spontaneous agreement on
this subject between the three Caucasian States.
Irrespective of the mandate and the frontiers, there remain certain additional
considerations to which the Supreme Council feel impelled to call the sympathetic
attention of the United States Government. In whatever hands the destinies ot
Armenia may be placed, an interval must inevitably occur, after the conclusion ot the
Treaty with Turkey, in which the security and even the existence ot the new State
will be in peril, unless it can be assured of extraneous aid. Its immediate needs will
be two in number—provision of the military forces required to defend it against
external attack and provision of the financial means that will enable it to constitute
an orderly administration and to develop its own economic resources. In the last
resort both of these necessities may be summed up under the heading of financial
assistance.
The question of military assistance is not thought to be so formidable as might at
first sight appear to be the’case. The forces at present possessed by the Armenian
Republic of Erivan have hitherto been to a large extent diverted—if not dissipated—
in the unfortunate disputes with its neighbours on the north and the east. When
these are composed—as may be hoped from an arrangement quite recently concluded
between the three Caucasian republics, there will be nothing to prevent a reconsti
tuted Armenia from devoting its undivided energies to the vindications and
maintenance of such frontiers as may be allotted to it.
The question has been anxiously examined of the extent to which the Allied
Powers might themselves be able by the movement of troops to assure the prompt
execution of the territorial clauses of the Treaty in the region of Armenia. Arms
and ammunition are already being provided, but it would raise false hopes on the
part both of the Armenians'and of their friends in all parts of the world if it were
generally believed that the Allied Powers could themselves spare troops for this
purpose. The responsibilities entailed upon them in addition to their heavy obliga
tions in Europe and elsewhere by the occupation or administration of territories that
formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire and by the necessity of enforcing the Treaty
in those parts of Turkey which are more accessible to their arms, will render
impossible the assumption of military responsibilities additional to the tremendous
burdens they have already assumed. Unless, therefore, Armenia can obtain
immediate asistance from some other Power she will be forced to relv in the main, so
far as military defence is concerned, upon the forces which she already possesses,
augmented by such instructors and munitions as the Allies can supply. Were,
however, a volunteer contingent or a volunteer corps to be raised for her defence in
America or in any foreign country, it would no doubt be a welcome and invaluable
incentive to her own patriotism. ^ But the offer of trained and technical assistance
and material aid on an organised scale by a great civilised State would be even more
opportune and would enable her to employ her own manhood in her own defence in
an effective way. It would be of the greatest value to know if the American Govern
ment or the American people will be at all disposed to render her this service.
The provision of credits, however, is even more urgent. The Council of the
League of Nations have had it in mind, we believe, to recommend the Assembly of the
League to guarantee a loan to Armenia from all countries that are members of the
League. The Supreme Council have, of course, no knowledge of the response that
may be returned to such an appeal, if it be made. But even assuming a favourable
reply, an interval must occur before effective aid could be given in this manner; it
is uncertain whether the response would be adequate to the need; and in any case
the appeal cannot, for reasons which are known, be addressed to the United States
Government. In these circumstances h?lp might fail to be forthcoming in the very
quarter where sympathy for the future Armenian State is most sincere and active,
where the burdens entailed by the war are believed to be less onerous than in any of
the other recently belligerent countries, and where the resources of a State and a
community, at once powerful and wealthy, have been least impaired.
It is not for the Supreme Council to suggest to the United States Government
by what means, whether by State action or by contributions, public or private, the
desired financial aid to the Armenian Republic could best be afforded. An American
loan of a few millions sterling might be the means of setting Armenia at once upon