Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎67r] (133/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
EASTERN (Arabia). [January 1J. 1
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 757/4/91] No. 1.
Iiecord of ('onversation between Karl Curzon and the Emir Feisal.
THE Emir Feisal, who has for some time been engaged in conversations at the
Foreign Office concerning the position in Arabia, having asked to see me, I received
him and General Haddad. Fash a this morning. The following was the gist of the long
conversation that ensued :—
The Emir began by protesting that he was a man of peace, and preferred to settle
all disputes by conciliatory methods. He wanted to settle them in the present instance
in co-operation with the British.
The situation that troubled him and his father, King Hussein, most was that which
now existed in the Hejaz. Not merely the borders of that State, but even the Holy
Cities were threatened by the menacing activities of the Wahabites, who, under the
leadership of Ibn Saoud, were bent on a war of militant aggression, and might at any
moment descend upon Mecca. In these circumstances, what were the British
Government, who had guaranteed the frontiers of the Hejaz State, going to do ? The
responsibility was theirs.
I replied at once that I was aware of no such guarantee as peculiar to the British,
and that I was astonished, if King Hussein attached so much value, as he naturally did,
to preserving the integrity of his kingdom, that he did not at once ratify the Treaty of
Versailles and take up his functions as a member of the League of Nations, to which he
would then officially belong, and to whose protection—more valuable than that of a
single Power only—he could then appeal.
Feisal did not dissent from this, but said that what he feared was an early, even
an immediate, attack, which he could not himself get back to the Hejaz, presuming
him to return at once to advise his father, in time to avert. I reminded him that our
latest news, no doubt better known to him than to me, was that Hussein’s forces had
gained a victory over the invader, and that there was consequently much less cause
for alarm. He admitted this, but said that the danger was recurrent, and could only
be removed by the British Government assuming responsibility for the defence of the
Hejaz, and letting Ibn Saoud know that if he attacked it would involve hostilities with
Great Britain.
1 replied that for nearly three years I had been trying to settle this dispute
between the two rival chieftains, and had proposed conferences and meetings between
the principals at every place that I could think of—Bombay, Aden, Jeddah, Cairo, &c.
It was true that representatives of both parties had met and talked. But I had never
been able to get the principals together. In these circumstances, what was the sense
of throwing the responsibility on to His Majesty’s Government? No one knew better
than the Emir that we could not send troops to the Hejaz, and even if we were willing
to do so, would not be asked. W hat was the meaning then of calling upon us to
defend the inland frontiers of the State
The Pmir explained that what his lather wanted was the present of a small fleet
of aeroplanes and armed motor-cars, which he hoped we would supply I said that I
could hold out no such hope, because, firstly, this would at once provoke the very
lighting which we desired to avoid, and, secondly, inasmuch as we were on friendly
terms with botli parties, and, indeed, were still subsidising Tbn Saoud, we could not
provide the armament to one ally with which to attack another. Further, if only the
two parties would meet and agree upon a frontier, there should be no need of active
fighting in order to secure it.
Feisal then complained bitterly of the system under which, while his father now
received no subsidy at all (the former payments having been withdrawn many months
ago), Ibn Saoud was in receipt of a handsome subsidy, which he utilised to attack our
ally, King Hussein. On behalf of the latter, he appealed both for the restoration of
the subsidy to its old figure and for the payment of arrears.
I said at once that there could be no question of this. The subsidy that had been
thought proper and reasonable during the war, when military operations were
[5311 n - 1]