Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎88r] (175/348)

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
CENTRAL EUROPE.
[October 6 .'
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
rc 19310/477/31 No 1 .
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).
(No. 838.)
Sir, Foreign Office, October 6 , 1921.
THE Italian Ambassador, who had asked to see me this afternoon, commenced
his conversation by a long exposition of the attitude of his Government with regard to
the dispute between Hungary and Austria, arising in the main out of the occupation of
the Burgenland. He assured me of the absolute disinterestedness of the Italian
Government in offering mediation, and said that the Marquis della Torretta was in a
position to do so with greater advantage than anyone else, because of his recent
experience as Minister at Vienna and the influence that he had been able to acquire
over the Austrian Government. He earnestly pleaded for British support in this
connection.
I told him that our one desire was to get the matter closed by whatever methods
seemed most likely to secure that result. With this end in view we should have been
quite willing, as at one stage seemed probable, for the Austrian and Hungarian
Governments to settle it themselves. When that chance disappeared, we had been
quite willing to accept the intervention of Dr. Benes ; but, now that we understood that
Dr. Benes had withdrawn from the stage, I was only too glad to support the mediation
of Italy. All that I would urge would be that it should take place without delay, and
that no decision of any kind affecting the frontier should be taken without reference to
the Ambassadors’ Conference at Paris.
This assurance the Ambassador was quite willing to give, and he left expressing
his complete satisfaction on this account.
He then asked me for my views on the Grasco-Turkish question, and said that his
own information led him to think that the moment for successful intervention had not
yet arrived. His chief in Italy was, however, most anxious to act in accord with us,
and would be very glad of any indication of our opinion.
1 reminded him that we had agreed earlier in the summer, with the knowledge of
our Allies, to a visit from M. Gounaris to this country in the course of the present
month. Whether M. Gounaris himself would come it was as yet too early to say,
because our information was to the effect that there was a political crisis in Greece
which might result in the fall of the present Ministry. In these circumstances, some
other spokesman of Greece might appear upon the scene. There was some reason to
think, whoever it might be, that his visit would not be confined to Great Britain, but
that he would also wish to visit Paris and Rome. If that were so we should all be
able to ascertain in a few weeks’ time what was the attitude of the Greek Government,
and the degree of pressure which it would be possible to exercise upon them.
Simultaneous or subsequent attempts might be made to explore the position of
Constantinople and Angora. At the latter place there appeared to be two parties :
an extreme Nationalist Party, who were in favour of invoking Bolshevik assistance
and throwing themselves into the arms of Russia; and a more moderate party,
said to be led by Mustapha Kemal, who were in favour—although no doubt
on their own terms—of coming to an arrangement with the Allies. When
we had ascertained the attitude of both the Greeks and the Turks it would
then be for the Allies to agree to' a policy amongst themselves, which should
be dictated at a conference to the two combatants. Such was the line of action
which seemed to me to be pointed out by the necessities of the case. But it
demanded for its success the closest communication and co-operation between the
Allies, since it would be useless and humiliating to have a conference at which we
disagreed, or to offer terms, either to the Greeks or to the Turks, upon which we were
not united. 1 thought myself that the greatest argument on both sides in favour of a
settlement was the approach of winter. The highlands of Angora would not be
particularly agreeable either for Greeks or Turks in the months of December and
January, and we might find both in a more reasonable frame of mind in a few weeks’
time.
The Ambassador thought that my anticipations corresponded correctly with the
needs of the situation, and felt sure of the hearty concurrence of his own Government.
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