Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎98r] (195/348)

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•of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10 th August, 1920, in advance of, and
independently of the duties and responsibilities undertaken by France towards her
Allies under the Tripartite Agreement and under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey,
which are interdependent. It is presumed that the transfer of this part of the
Bagdad line by Turkey to the French group is not intended to override article 294
of the Treaty of Sevres, whereby Turkey was herself to liquidate the whole Bagdad
Railway on the demand of the principal Allies. Nor is it supposed that the article
can be intended to give France a large portion of the railway without regard to the
claims of her other Allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of Versailles
and the Treaty of Sevres is the Allies’ common asset, and in respect of which special
arrangements are contemplated under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement.
Paragraph 3 of article 10 provides that each party shall have the right to use for
military transport that part of the Bagdad line which lies in the other’s territory.
This in effect appears to mean that France must permit Turkish troops to be carried
from Konia to Nisibin and possibly thus threaten the Mesopotamian frontier. Great
Britain can hardly believe that the French Government would propose to conclude
an arrangement which may well have such serious strategic consequences to her
position in Mesopotamia without any prior reference to His Majesty’s Government.
Moreover, it is not understood how the acceptance of this servitude on territory
placed under a mandate of the League of Nations can be accepted without prior
consultation with the other members of the League concerned.
The appended letter from Yussouf Kemal expresses the hope that the French
Government will endeavour to solve all questions relative to Turkish independence
and sovereignty; it goes on to add that the Government of the Grand Assembly (it
also speaks of the k ‘ Turkish Government ") is ready to grant a number of conces
sions and other advantages in favour of France and French nationals, apparently
both within and without the French zone. The form of the letter inevitably lends
itself to the interpretation that there is some connection of a conditional nature
between the Turkish hope and promise, and the expression “questions relative to
Turkish independence and sovereignty " would appear to be quite outside the scope
of an arrangement regarding Cilicia and Syria.
His Majesty’s Government will be glad to learn whether the letter in question,
which has been officially communicated to them, is regarded by the French Govern
ment as an integral part of the agreement. The implication is suggested that it was
written in connection with some written or verbal understanding with M. Franklin-
Bouillon. His Majesty’s Government would be pleased to receive information on
these points and to know whether the French Government have replied, or propose
to reply, to the letter of Yussouf Kemal Bey.
The agreement and the letter have also formed the subject of various statements
in the press regarding secret clauses or annexes. Tt has been alleged that, under
arrangements concluded but not published, France is to have a monopoly of the
gendarmerie organisation in 'Turkey (which would be entirely contrary to the
arrangements for international control contemplated by the Treaty and already to
some extent carried out in anticipation) ; that a large portion of the war loan is to
be handed over to Turkey ; that a French loan has been arranged; that France has
promised to supply the Nationalists with a formidable armament; that she has
undertaken to support Turkish claims to Smyrna and Thrace; even that she has
obtained a promise of anti-British agitation by the Nationalists in Mesopotamia.
His Majesty’s Government cannot believe that there is any foundation for any of
these statements, but, in view of their wide dissemination in the press, His Majesty’s
Government would like to be in a position to issue a formal denial of these and
similar assertions and to announce that the published agreement was accompanied
by no other written or verbal understandings.
In conclusion, with regard to the agreement as a whole, His Majesty’s Govern
ment find the utmost difficulty in recognising in its present no doubt provisional form
any resemblance to the tractation locale described by M. Briand. On the contrary,
it has the appearance of being a separate agreement concluded by one of the Allies
with an enemy Government without consultation with the remainder, and this
impression, unless it is dissipated, cannot fail to react unfavourably upon the policy
of full and complete Allied co-operation in which His Majesty’s Government have
always believed and which they have consistently practised in their desire to bring
about a general peace in the Near East.
His Majesty’s Government look forward to receiving a full and friendly explana
tion on the whole of these points from the French Government, and they express the