Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎138r] (275/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
[104 ff—1]
EAblERN (Iurkey). [September 29.J
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 10261/27/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Raw,bold {Constantinoyle).
(No. 959.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, September 29, 1922.
THIS afternoon Dr. Nihad Rechad, the Kemalist representative in London, called
upon me at his special request in order to discuss the situation that had arisen between
the British and Angora Governments.
He began by thanking me for tbe friendly attitude that I had shown in Paris,
and congratulated me on the agreement that had there been arrived at. He said that
he came as a warm friend of good relations between our two peoples and of the early
conclusion of peace, and he hoped that I would not desist from my efforts to carry the
matter to a successful conclusion.
I said that I proposed to treat him with the utmost frankness, because a situation
had arisen in which immediate action alone could prevent the outbreak of hostilities and
probably the renewal of war between Great Britain and Turkey. 1 was at a loss to
understand the tactics that had been pursued by Mustapha Kemal since he had received
the Paris note. This communication, it could not be denied, contained an immense and
unexpected concession to his views. The three Great Powers had found themselves in
absolute accord upon the point, and it rested only with Kemal, in his own interests as
well as in those of peace, to meet without delay the advance that had been made.
Nevertheless, a week all but a day had passed since the Paris note was despatched to
him. So far, he had not answered it, and, even if he offered the excuse that he was
waiting to consult M. Franklin-Bouillon, who had arrived at Smyrna on Wednesday,
there was no reason why a reply should not by now have been sent. On the contrary,
Mustapha Kemal had amused himself by returning captious replies to the British
Commander-in-chief, and meanwhile he had authorised the ; continuous advance of
Turkish troops into the Ohanak neutral zone up to a point where thev were in direct
contact with the British forces, and where the situation, as I should presently tell him,
was one of a critical description. The sequence of events contemplated in Paris was,
firstly, a general acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of the Allied proposals and of the
conditions attached to them; secondly, an immediate meeting in Mudania with the
Allied generals and the Greek commander, in order to arrange for the retirement of
the Greek forces ; and, thirdly, such arrangements as might be required pending the
holding of the Peace Conference itself. Where, I asked, was Mustapha Kemal at this
moment ?
Dr. Nihad Rechad explained that he had gone off with M. Franklin-Bouillon to
Angora.
I replied that 1 had nothing to say as to KemaTs desire to consult the Gram!
National Assembly, although I observed that he had already summoned his Cabinet for
consultation in Smyrna; but that he should go off to Angora at this moment, instead
of going to Mudania, seemed to me to constitute a tactical error on his part which I
found it difficult to explain. Meanwhile, I would tell Dr. Nihad Rechad frankly what
had happened, and what was going to happen. Mustapha Kemal having, in spite of
the Paris note and in spite of frequent protests, absolutely declined to withdraw his
forces from the Chanak neutral zone, and these forces having continued to advance
until they were in a position where we were informed that they even made grimaces at
the British troops on the other side of the barbed wire, a situation had arisen which
could not he tolerated by any army—it would not be tolerated by that of Mustapha
Kemal himself. It further constituted a miliiary menace of the most serious description.
Warning after warning to the Turkish commander having been ignored, the British
Government had decided that this situation, for which they were in no sense responsible,
must be terminated. Orders had therefore been given this morning to the British
commander to call upon the Kemalist forces to retire, and, in the event of their refusing,
to compel them to do so. Thus we might, owing to the culpable action of these forces,
find ourselves within a few hours on the edge of war.