File 1355/1917 Pt 1 ‘Peace Settlement- The Arms Traffic Convention 1919’ [‎288v] (581/600)

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and among potentially hostile populations, whose power of giving trouble will
largely depend on the extent to which they are effectively armed. As
regards Turkey, it must be assumed that she will be in no position, after the
war, to resist the united pressure of the Entente Powers.
It is necessary to emphasise two points, both in regard to Arabia and
to Asia Minor, &c., viz.: —
(1) that the interested Powers will be dealing with territories, e.g., their
several “spheres of influence” in Asia Minor, Ac., in relation
to which their authority will fall very far short of full sovereignty,
and in some cases may be of a very vague and ill-defined
character; and
(2) that an international agreement in regard to these areas will be of
little practical value unless it can be established that there is real
community of interest between the contracting parties.
For these reasons the best prospect of successfully controlling the traffic
lies in cutting off the supply at the source by prohibiting all export of arms
and ammunition to the territories in question.
4. Arabia. —The situation in Arabia is complicated by the new political
conditions—of which the proposed international agreement must obviously
take account—arising out of the emancipation of the Arabs from Turkish
control. Responsibility for enforcing the provisions of the agreement
within the various areas affected by the new conditions must rest in each
case with the European Power exercising supervisory authority, in whatever
degree, towards the particular area.
5. Mask at and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . —The Government of India have in the
past raised strong objection to the introduction into these regions, in which
British influence has been paramount for many years past, of anything in
the nature of international control. It was on this ground that Maskat was
excluded, at the instance of the British delegates at Brussels, from the scope
of the draft Additional Act of 1908. The principle is of equal application
at the present day, though the circumstances are not quite the same. We
have, since 1908, induced the Sultan of Maskat to establish, under our
auspices, a system of control over the arms traffic similar to that contem
plated in the draft Additional Act; and we have purchased the acquiescence
of the French Government in the arrangements made. Provided it were
clearly understood that no interference would be tolerated with the measures
taken by the Sultan to control the traffic, and that responsibility for their
due enforcement, vis-a-vis other Powers, rests solely with the British Govern
ment, there might be no great objection to bringing Maskat within the scope
of the proposed international Convention, particularly as the only Inter
national body contemplated by the Convention, viz., the Central Bureau at
Brussels set up by the Brussels Act of 1890 (the International Bureaux
in the prohibited area, proposed in the draft Additional Act, may be
dispensed with), is to be merely an agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. for collecting and co-ordinating
information, and to exercise no executive powers of any kind. Nevertheless,
the balance of advantage appears to lie in maintaining the status quo at
Maskat, under which the control of the arms traffic is the exclusive concern
of the local authorities and the British Government, and affords no pretext
for interference by any other Power in any circumstances whatever.
6. Similar considerations apply to the whole of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
including both the Persian and Arabian littorals. There can be no question
of abating in the smallest degree the claims of His Majesty’s Government,
as formally asserted by Lord Lansdowne in 1903 and reiterated by
Sir Edward Grey in 1907, to the possession of special interests in this
region. So far as the control of the arms traffic is concerned, sole and
absolute authority throughout the Gulf must rest with the British Govern
ment. *
In all the circumstances, it seems desirable that Maskat, Persia, and the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. should, if possible, be wholly excluded from the scope of the
international Convention. But it is essential that Great Britain should