Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎34v] (69/220)

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question might be put in reply : “ Would you sooner lose Baghdad, or ensure its
retention by the aid of Japanese troops ? ” To such a question I believe that there
would be but one answer.
Another Indian objection may be that even if Mesopotamia becomes an Arab State
under a British Protectorate, still, both in Baghdad and Basra, which have been won for
the most part by Indian arms, Indian interests have been created which in the long run
will be predominant, and that no other Asiatic rival should be allowed to intrude upon
an Indian preserve. My reply would be that I contemplate no such intrusion, and that
the climate of Mesopotamia is not such as to encourage an active colonising policy on
the part of Japan. She lias much better prospects elsewhere.
A more formidable objection is the general consideration whether, by inviting
Japan to join in the military defeat of the Central Powers, supposing them to be
defeated, we might foment her ambitions or unduly aggrandise her position throughout
the Asiatic continent. I am not myself much alarmed at this. When the European
treaties with Japan were revised, and she obtained judicial and tariff autonomy, and
when at a later date she defeated Bussia, she became a great World Power, comparable
with the Powers of the West. Nothing can deprive her of that position. Her
co-operation in the present war has recognised and emphasised it. If she can help to
search for and sink German ships with her fleet, and if her guns and shells have been
employed to kill German and Austrian soldiers in Europe, is it a great aggravation of
her claim that a Japanese army corps should be in at the death of one of the main
enemies of the Alliance, an enemy who is being trained, armed, spurred on, and led by
the arch-enemy, Germany herself?
I am aware that objections may be entertained to any undue or premature
encouragement of Japanese pretensions by our Australian Dominions, who have their
own reasons for disliking and even fearing the Japanese in the future. I hardly think,
however, that these suspicions would be aroused in the present case ; for, firstly, no
Australian troops have been or are likely to be employed in the Mesopotamian
campaign ; and, secondly, there is not, nor is likely to be, any considerable Australian
trade or connection with those countries in the future.
To my mind the question is one to be decided in the last resort by military and not
by political considerations. If the position in Mesopotamia cannot be rendered
permanently secure with our own forces, if the European Allies cannot by themselves
crush the Turk and destroy German ambitions in Baghdad, then I would not hesitate
to invoke Japanese aid in the task.
It is conceivable that the Turkish position, squeezed by the British, French, and
Indian nippers on every quarter, might with the addition of Japanese pressure collapse
in irretrievable ruin. And, moreover, it might not be a bad thing at the Peace
Conference to have at least one Ally who would have a personal interest in seeing that
we do not give back Mesopotamia in order to satisfy the aspirations of some unfortunate
minor member or even major member of the Alliance.
October 3, 1917.
C. of K.