Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎66v] (133/220)

18. But if this is so in the case of* Armenia, it will
also be so, in a hardly lesser degree, in the case of the
Arab countries. The French are well aware that in
Syria, with the possible exception of the Lebanon, opinion
is deeply averse from the idea of French assistance, and
that the Joint Declaration has been received with
enthusiasm, as implying that the French Government
do not intend to force it upon an unwilling people.
19. In Syria there is a de facto Arab administration,
recognised by the Allies, and unquestionably competent
to express the feelings of the population. On the
evidence that has reached us from the spot, do the
French seriously believe that the Syrians, through their
national representatives, will declare for France ?
20. It is already clear that they will refuse French
assistance, and in that event the only means left to
France for asserting her influence over Syria would be to
occupy the country militarily. But Sir Mark Sykes, who
cannot be suspected of lack of sympathy for French
aspirations, has telegraphed from Syria that the substitu
tion of a French Army of Occupation for the British
would precipitate a catastrophe.
21. It would, in fact, be resisted by the Syrians by
force of arms ; and while the Armenians are perhaps
better known than the Syrians to the Western civilised
world, and might excite more sympathy as being
Christians, it must never be forgotten that the Syrians,
as a predominantly Moslem nation, would have behind
them the sympathy of the Moslem world.
22. Great Britain, with her millions of Moslem
subjects, could not afford to be a consenting party to an
arrangement under which a Moslem people, liberated by
British arms from a Government which, though
oppressive, -was also Moslem, would be abandoned to
foreign conquest again, and this time by a Christian
Power. Could France herself, with her Moslem subjects,
afford to take such action ? And, apart from self-interest,
would she care to assume this role ?
23. North Mesopotamia has been occupied more
recently than Syria by the British forces, but it is already
evident that the Arabs of Mosul desire union with the
rest of Mesopotamia, so that what applies to Syria applies
to Northern Mesopotamia also.
24. His Majesty’s Government have, of course, no
intention of attempting any one-sided alteration of the
arrangements contemplated under the agreement, and
they recognise that in Syria and North Mesopotamia, if
taken by themselves, the principle of self-determination
would impose serious sacrifices upon France. Fortunately,
however, the same principle promises the French more
than adequate compensation in Turkish and Russian
Armenia.
25. It appears, therefore, that we have a strong case
for insisting on the revision of the 1910 Agreement,
seeing that, if it were carried out, the consequences
would be most prejudicial to our interests in the Middle
East, while the alternative settlement on the basis of
self-determination not only safeguards our interests but
is, if anything, more favourable than the other to the
interests of France.
Foreign Office,
December 19, 1918.