Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎78v] (157/220)

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Hie authorities at Kuwait had failed to realise this aspect of the matter
or the necessity of keeping me informed of their action, with the result that,
while complaints poured in to I bn Saud and were duly passed on to me, I
was not in a position to att'ord an explanation of the action taken or of the
reasons therefor.
It was clear to me, however, that some mistake had occurred and, in
view of the risk of disturbance inherent in delay, I felt that no course was
open to me but to give certain guarantees regarding the future on behalf of
the Kuwait authorities.
I accordingly arranged with Ibn Saud that all Najd caravans should
be accompanied by special envoys on his behalf, that his Kuwait Agent,
Abdulla al Aafisi, should be appointed his special representative in respect
of tribal parties, who were not in a position to come in to procure special
envoys, c.//., the eastern tribes such as Mutair and Subai, and, finally, that
all regular town caravans should carry passes signed by the local Amirs.
These arrangements I at once communicated to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait,
assuring Ibn Saud, at the same time, that the caravans already turned away
could now return to bring up supplies, which would not be refused provided
the arrangements as regards passes and envoys were duly observed. At the
■same time I pointed out to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , firstly, that it was not altogether
reasonable to restrict exports into the interior from Kuwait on the basis of
pre-war trade, because, in those days, the interior used to draw supplies from
Mecca, Damascus and Basrah among other places, whereas, under existing
conditions and with the restriction of shipping to the Hasa ports, Kuwait
had come to be the sole source of supply to Najd and, secondly, that, in view
of the arrangements made by the Mission with Ibn Saud in consultation with
Colonel Hamilton, the responsibility of the Kuwait authorities was restricted
to the prevention of illicit and unauthorised export only, while Ibn Saud
was responsible that no goods, exported to Najd under proper authority, should
leave his territories for an enemy destination.
Suffice it here to say that the arrangements now proposed bv me were
promptly accepted, and the due clearance of the Najd caravans previously
turned away created a satisfactory revulsion of feeling throughout Ibn Saud’s
territories, and an episode, which had caused so much ill feediim served very
well to remind the people of Najd of what the British Government could and
would do m the event of their abusing the privileges extended to them.
M hi e on this subject. I should mention that the Kuwait debacle was
universally attributed m Najd to the machinations of Shaikh Salim, who was
at the time, undoubtedly piqued by the establishment of effective British
control of the blockade and could not have found a better weapon, wherewith
to oppose it, than to make the arrangements weigh heavily on the people of
JNajd, who could be trusted not to remain silent under such provocation. The
proclamation issued by him—apparently at the request of the British
autnonties—and the unsympathetic manner, in which it was enforced, lent
colour to the accusations made by the Najdis.
K ^ ma y> tlle acceptance of my proposals restored confidence in
A ajd, Ibn Saud promptly set to work to ensure the effective stoppage of smug-
\mir of 0 7 ilfi he 9 aslm ~°^ e ? f hl j first act .! was the summary dismissal of the
Amir of Zilfi, who was notorious for complicity m the smuggling business and
timB range COmci . d T%° Which Shaikh Salim was not unaware, had been
^ PerSOn priVlleg f d to / x Port supplies from Kuwait, when the rest of
uh iNajd caravans vere turned awav—and evervthino' bade* fm’v 0 + r 4-1
establishment of an effective blockade all round. " 1 1 lor * le
ine only person, who was not satisfied, was Shaikh Salim, regarding whos
machinations for the reversal of the arrangements above described this is no
the place to speak. On the 28th June I was able to report that Ibn Sand wa
com p letelv satisfied that the interests of his people in the matter of the block
cMe vore liemg duly safeguarded and, at the same tiAe, I expressed the hop*
oat 1 he official blockade would be maintained as affording the only hope o
cutting oft supplies from enemy elements. In short, everything seemed to b<
1.1 a fan way to a sufficiently satisfactory solution of flip 1 11
W],™ about the middle of duly, I reeenVdlhe Jws ttt G™Sf
decided once more to place their trust in Shaikh Salim and to leave thi prose
cut,on of the blockade entirely in his hands, on the condition of hfs accentim
tne services of a British Officer to assist his own blockade staff. At the s mi
ime it was decided that imports into Kuwait from India and elsewhere shouT
be regulated on the basis of the reasonable monthly requirements Tr
ail d its dependent tribes. The Political Wnt at ir„i , s 1 , "■'Y
addressed a letter to Shaikh Salim on behalf of H A! ’s Government ' U ’’ -
eating the sanction of the Government to Hiese a»an„ts Uni
The neus of this development of the situation was naturally extremely un
palatable to Ibn Saud who saw Shaikh Salim once more given a fr^ hand ?
promote smuggling to the enemy and to make the blockade such as it ren nined
irksome to the people of Najd. I reported that at the very moment JCn thesi
arrangements were being made, certain enemy caravans were actuaUv presen