'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎91v] (187/424)

156
second detachment, also of one company, was to be detailed to clear
the captured line of trench and make prisoners of all men left in it by
the enemy. The attack of the 19th Brigade, which was about 2,000
strong, would be subsidiary to that ot the 35th, and the 19th must hold
the enemy to fcheir ground and be prepared to make a thrust home should
a favourable opportunity occur. The 9th Infantry Brigade, which
could muster about 2,000 bayonets, would support the attack of the 35th
Brigade, and was, at 0600 to be in position in certain trenches on the
left bank, then occupied by the rearmost portions of the 35th Brigade,
and lying about 1,200 yards upstream of the fort which stood on the right
bank of the Tigris.
By the time that the first bombardment of ten minutes had ended,
the assaulting infantry were to be within 150 yards of the enemy's front
line of trench ; and the advance to this distance was to have been made
under cover of and during the various bombardments. The 128th
Pioneers were to be at the headquarters of the Division by 0600 on the
21st. Onecompanyofth's battalion was to be prepared to fill intrenches
as they were captured, and to make roadways over them for our guns
and transport. Cooked rations for two days were to be carried on the
man, and as many as possible in the second line transport; and all
transport was to be ready to advance at the shortest notice. Prisoners
were to be brought to divisional headquarters, and were to be handed
over to the divisional cavalry, the 16th Cavalry.
The total frontage that was actually held by the Turks was, as has
been stated, about 1,300 yards, and under these orders the main attack
was to be made on a frontage of about 500 yards by a force of some 3,700
bayonets, and a subsidiary attack was to be delivered by the 2,000
men that remained. Only one battalion was in reserve, but the Corps
reserve, consisting of the 28th Infantry Brigade, about 1,300 fighting
men, which was held in hand for the purpose either of exploiting success
or repairing failure, was on the left bank and was for practical purposes
also the reserve of the Division.
It seems from the ten our of the orders given by General Younghusband
that it was intended and hoped that the 35th and 9th Infantry Brigades
should at once overrun the enemy's first and second lines, and that on
their ability to do so would depend the success or failure of the attack.
If this was the case it would perhaps have been better to have devoted to
this operation a larger proportion of the troops that were available,
leaving the four battalions properly belonging to the 19th Brigade,
some 1,330 bayonets, to carry out the subsidiary movement; for if a
very rapid success were gained against the Turkish right, time would
not have been allowed for its reinforcement by such troops from the left
as could not be held by the efforts of the 19th Infantry Brigade. Fur
ther, in a methodical attack of this kind success is generally either com-