'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎92r] (188/424)

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plete or failure absolute; since it is most difficult m any case to vary
arrangements so as to meet new situations after the fighting has com
menced, and with the inadequate means of communication that were
at the disposal of the 7th Division, it was in all probability hardly
practicable to do so.
The artillery bombardment, in which the warships joined, duly
took place on the 20th, the land guns being supported by those in the
Cranefly and Dragonfly. The Turkish guns hardly attempted to reply
to our shelling, but at first its effect was not apparent as regards any
reduction in the volume of the rifle fire from the enemy's trenches, and
whenever our troops endeavoured to gain ground they were met by a
storm of bullets. Some advances were, however, made, and it was
then ascertained the Turkish riflemen were holding a series of entrench
ments in front of their main line. These therefore were bombarded,
and as a result the enemy's activities diminished to an appreciable
extent.
During a reconnaissance by air which was made on the morning of
the 20th it was noticed that the Turks were still holding their positions
at Hanna, where a gun pit or epaulment had been made behind the
centre or right centre of their main line, and 2,000 men had been seen.
The entrenchments at Es Sinn on the left bank had been elaborated,
but owing to cloud no observation over the ground on the right bank
had been possible. Later in the day General Townshend telegraphed
that fully 3,000 infantry with guns were moving westwards along the
left bank, that other troops were following these, and that a camp which
had been observed at the Dujaila canal had disappeared. The receipt
of this news caused General Aylmer not unreasonably to infer that, owing
to the gun fire of the British, the withdrawal of at any rate a part of the
enemy's army might be in progress. But it may be pointed out that the
troops might also possibly have been either a division returning after
relief at Hanna, or even a large working party that had been employed
at the Es Sinn position on the left bank ; or General Townshend might,
as so often happened in Mesopotamia, have been misled in his estimate
of the numbers of the enemy by the distorting effect of mirage. The
British brigades, however, were, as a proper measure of precaution
told that steps must be taken so as to ensure that the fact of any retire
ment that might be made on the part of the Turk would at once be as
certained, and that the force must then be prepared immediately to
follow the enemy. But warning was given of the presence of entrench
ments which might be held by the Turks at Sannaiyat.
The reports that came in on the evening of the 20th from observers
on the right bank of the river were to the effect that tents behind the
enemy's line were being struck, and that movemeots westwards of. trans
port were taking place. Formed bodies had been seen in motion behind