File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎166r] (327/508)

No. 74 op 1907.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOKEIGN DEPARTMENT.
SECRET.
External.
To
The Eight Hon’ble JOHN MOELEY, O.M.,
Sis Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.
Simla, the 25th April 1907.
Sib,
We have the honour to refer to your telegram, dated 8th January 1907, ( /^ ' ! ° 1
in which you requested that the Political Officer at D’thala might he instructed
to furnish, as soon as practicable, a report as to the date when his withdrawal
would he possible, and as to the means of conducting frontier affairs after his
withdrawal. We have also to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram, dated
the 13th March 1907, on the same subject.
2. We forward herewith copies of our recent correspondence with the
Government of Bombay From c. 1668-1858, the East India Company’s administration in the city of Bombay [Mumbai] and western India. From 1858-1947, a subdivision of the British Raj. It was responsible for British relations with the Gulf and Red Sea regions. , from which you will see that both the Bombay
Government and the Political Eesident are of opinion that an early date
should be fixed for the withdrawal, since, if the tribes realise that Major
Jacob’s stay among them is to be merely temporary, any advice that he may
give them is not likely to result in an arrangement of a lasting nature.
As, however, the situation is somewhat complicated, and as local dissensions
among the tribes do not apparently involve any danger to Major Jacob, we
have taken advantage of the discretion, which you granted us in the matter of
fixing the date for the withdrawal, and have ordered him to remain at D’thala
pending receipt of your final instructions.
3. The presence of a Political Officer at D’thala has hitherto been of
advantage in three ways. Pirstly, he has been able to afford valuable assistance
to the Eesident in the settlement of inter-tribal quarrels, and thereby has
contributed to the safety of the trade route. Secondly, he has exercised his
influence to check Turkish intrigues in the protected territory, to adjust
disputes between Turkish subjects and our tribesmen, and to prevent violation
of the frontier by either party. Thirdly, he has kept a watchful eye on the
conflict between the Turks and the Arabs in the Yemen, and has prevented
the tribes on our side of the frontier from being drawn into the struggle.
4. As instances of the successful results which have recently attended his
efforts in connection with the protection of the trade routes and the manage
ment of local border affairs, we may mention that he succeeded in restrain
ing the Kotaibis from joining in an attack on the Amir of D’thala, he brought
about a lull in the serious fighting between the Amir and the Shairis which
has eventualIv led to a reconciliation, and he was able by communication with
the Kaimmakam of Kotaba to prevent an incursion of Turkish subjects as re- . ..
inforcemeuts for the Amir’s enemies. But for Major Jacob s interposition in
the latter case, the fighting might have extended in such a manner as to lead
to interference by the Turks on the ostensible pretext of protecting their own