File 600/1905 Pt 3 'Aden Hinterland: Situation; Withdrawal of Political Agent from Dthala; Treaties with Haushabi, Kotaibi and Alawi chiefs' [‎181v] (358/508)

V
h
I
31 Referring to the Abdali, Fadthli and Subehi he wrote c< A simple
regular police system introduced, supported by the assistance of our friendly
allies the Abdalis and bv the public announcement that plundering or acts of
violence in our neighbourhood will no longer be allowed, will cause tte three
tribes to settle down quietly and to abandon marauding as dangerous and unpro
fitable They will then return to the more useful habits of agricultural and
other peaceable pursuits Furthermore, these tribes will then form a settled and
friendly barrier, a buffer in fact, between us and the more distant tribes m the
hills, should the latter ever take it into their heads to be troublesome which
they are not at present. ”
32. “ There would be no occasion to interfere in intertribal quarrels more
than we do now. We should simply state publicly that we should not allow the
roads in the immediate neighbourhood of Aden to he disturbed and that mea
sures would be taken in concert with those who were desirous of peace and
quiet to ensure this. This would immediately be understood as nothing more
than the assumption by a powerful Government of its proper position. And
punishment inflicted in such a manner would not cause the heartburning* which
would inevitably follow if we attempted to bring about the same remit by
employing one tribe against another.
33. “ I may also remark that I mentioned patrolling to show that it was
not intended that the Horse should be kept idle and only rush forth when plun
derers were said to be afoot. Iso good would come of such a course. No plun
derers would ever be caught and punished. The disorder would rather be
increased.'’
84. Referring to his alternative proposal to subsidize the Abdali he wrote:—
“ I confess to having no liking for it. Though pitched at the lowest possible
sum, and I have great doubts whether it is not too low, it will be as costly as
the Troop of Horse and not nearly so effectual. Putting tribe against tribe
increases the animosity between them and tends to perpetrate the very thing
we would fain put a stop to. Every time the friendly tribe had to act, it would
intensify the blood feud already existing and most certainly bring about
reprisals while no punishment would ever be administered sufficient to act as a
deterrent for the future.”
35. This letter ended with a Postscript dated the 31st October 1865 in
which Colonel Merewether wrote :—“ This is certainly a time when for every
reason, on the score of policy and seif-interest, as well as humanity and justice,
we should come forward and by a fitting change in management restore the
people and country to the prosperity they might enjoy.”
36. India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. despatch, Political, No. 84, dated London, the 31st October
1866, contains the views expressed by the Secretary of State after full consider
ation of all the opinions expressed. This commences with a reference to the
operations conducted against the Fadthli Sultan by Lieutenant-Colonel Mere
wether and then proceeds to a consideration of his proposal that to prevent a
recurrence of similar collisions a small body of Irregular Horse or Mounted
Police should he posted to Aden under the authority of the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. .
37. In referring to the fear entertained by the Government of India that
the location of such a force at Aden would have a tendency to embroil the
British authorities there with the adjoining tribes and that in all probability it
might lead eventually to requisition for a much larger force than any then in
contemplation, the Secretary of State took note of Colonel Merewether s reply
that he could assure Government that no person felt more strongly than he din
the expediency of refraining from interference with the neighbouring tribes
and abstaining from any concern with their internal quarrels and that he
could confidently state from his knowledge of the people and the position that
the course recommended by him was the one most likely to promote that end
by avoiding the heartburnings which putting clan against clan must inevitably
create.
38. He took note of the opinion expressed by the Government of India
that in the event of its being necessary to entertain such a force as that under
consideration it would be advisable to raise it at Aden from amongst the Arab
8
f