'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎94r] (192/424)

161
♦
and 15 men, who had long ago exhausted their small stock of locally
made and somewhat defective bombs, succeeded in escaping along the
bank of the river to the positions from which they had started earlier
in the day ; and here they found that the remainder of the 35th Brigade
were being assembled.
Owing to the complete breakdown of the means of communication
on the left of his division. General Younghusband did not for some time
realise what had occurred ; but since, according to reports from the
troops on the right bank, progress seemed to have been made by the
35th Brigade, while the right had, he knew, been checked, orders were
at 0900 sent to the field batteries to advance for a distance of 1,000
yards, and the headquarters of the division were moved to the point
which earlier in the day had been occupied by the headquarters of the
9th Brigade. Half an hour later a report was sent to Aylmer to the
effect that it was believed that the men of the 35th Brigade had gained
the Turkish trenches and were making progress but that the 19th Bri
gade had not been successful; and, at 1000 orders were given that
all the guns were to direct their fire on the Turkish right so as to assist
the men of the 35th Brigade. Meanwhile General Aylmer had sent
instructions for the 28th Infantry Brigade to advance closer to the front.
At this juncture it appeared, from movements that were observed
by our troops on the right bank, as if a counter-attack might be made
against the right of the 35th or the 19th Brigade. General Aylmer con
sequently sent instructions for the 28th Brigade (less the 56th Rifles)
to move forward to a position from which assistance could, if necessary,
be lent to the 19th Brigade which could either meet the enemy's attack
directly or take it in flank. At about the same time a message was for
warded to Younghusband that the attack was to be prosecuted with
energy. But before either of these messages could come to hand. General
Younghusband learnt of the failure of the 35th Brigade and of the retire
ment # of the remnant from the enemy's position.
It seems that Younghusband now formed the opinion that the imme
diate renewal of the assault was out of the question, and that time must
be given to the units for the purpose of reorganising and preparing
for a fresh attempt. At about 1130, therefore, orders were issued
that a rapid bombardment of the Turkish line was again to be made at
1250 and that this would be followed by a general attack which
would be delivered at 1400 and his decision was communicated both to
Aylmer, who meanwhile had made a somewhat similar proposal, and
to Keary on the right bank. At about the same time a request was also
made that General Aylmer should give orders for the 28th Brigade to
deliver an attack.
It is never easy to circulate orders during a battle, and as has been
pointed out, the means of signal communication at the disposal of the