'Naval Staff monographs (historical) vol 4 no 15 - Naval operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf' [‎84] (103/150)

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concentration was a slow process on account of tlie difficulties
of navigation during the low water season, which much delayed
the passage of shipping. 1 Another factor bearing adversely on
the case was the shortage of river transport. At this date no
railways had been built by us in the country, and we were
completely dependent upon river shipping for the transport
of reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies of all sorts, even
down to such things as firewood, from the base, to our forces
up the Tigris and Euphrates. The question of transport became
more and more serious as the lines of communication lengthened,
and the quantity available for the advance to Baghdad was
quite insufficient for such an undertaking. 2
65. Naval Forces. —The Comet, z whose improvised gun
mountings had broken away from the decks, had now returned
from repair at Basra. With the Shaitan 11 and Sum an a 5 she was
detailed for the advance to Baghdad. The Firefly 6 , first of the
new " small China gunboats," which were being put together at
Abadan, was now available. There were present also the four
Naval 4'7 inch guns in their horseboats, with the Shushan 1 and
Massoudieh, 8 each armed with a pom-pom and a Maxim, to tow
them. Captain Nunn arrived at the front on 22nd November
and directed the Naval operations from the Comet or Firefly as
occasion required.
66. The Advance begins: Battle of Ctesiphon. —General
Townshend had given it as his opinion that, unless great risk
was to be run, the advance to Baghdad ought to be carried out
by two Divisions, or by one Division supported closely by
another complete Division, exclusive of the garrisons of the
important places Nasiriya, Ahwaz, and Amara. 9 The available
troops under his command comprised his own VI. Division,
and he was reinforced by five squadrons of cavalry, three
infantry battalions, and a R.H.A. battery : he had thus some
14,000 men. Two Divisions were promised from France, but
the leading troops were not expected to arrive at Basra until the
end of November, and some further time must elapse before
they could be transported to the front and made available for
the advance.
1 It took about nine days for a steamer towing a barge each side of her
(tbe usual method) to reach Aziziya from Basra.
2 For an extensive discussion of the question of river transport and
railways see Mesopotamia Commission ; Report. It is outside the scope of
this Monograph.
3 Lieut. Gr. E. Harden.
4 Lieut. Aubrey 0. Thursfield.
6 Sub-Lieut. Lionel 0. P. Tudway.
6 Lieut. Christopher J. F. Eddis. She was launched 23rd October 1915,
and left Basra for Aziziya on 3rd November 1915. Armament, 1—4-inch,
1—6-pr., and Maxims. She was equipped with W/T.
7 Lieut. F. W. Lyte, D.S.C., R.N.R.
8 Lieut. F. 0. Hendry, Indian Army.
9 Tel. to General Kemball, 3rd October 1915.