'Mesopotamia Administration Committee. Position of Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox).' [‎147v] (4/6)

8. Telegraphing to the War Office on the 9th July 1917 (No.
X. 2782) General Maude took strong exception to the proposals con
tained in the Secretary of State’s telegram. He adhered to the views
expressed in Sir P. Cox’s telegram of the 7th April (see paragraph 2). He
pointed out that the military position at Baghdad was still insecure and that
further severe fighting was to be anticipated in the autumn and winter. He
expressed no anxiety as to the result “ provided my hands are not otherwise
tied and we are not swamped by numbers,” but went on to make an appeal
for a “ free hand ” in the following terms :—
“ I would ask that I should be given every opportunity to concentrate my
whole energies on this issue/ and that development of civil
administration of Baghdad Vilayet, except as regards such matters
as clearly do not clash with military .necessity, and which we are
already taking in hand, should wait until we are securely established
here once for all. We are engaged in a vast war, the issues of which
are vital, and it seems to me that if we attempt to combine general
development of country with defeat of enemy, we shall be attempting
too much, and we shall fail. A commander in the field has great
responsibilities, and he must devote every moment available to task
before him in order to ensure success.
“ If, then, civil considerations which may conflict with military interests
are urged upon him repeatedly, though, no doubt, unintentionally,
owing, perhaps, to military situation not being viewed exactly in
true perspective, and if he is not free to resist them, his anxieties
and his already heavy duties will be considerably increased, and his
attention will be constantly distracted from what is for time bein^
the main issue. It is one thing for a commander to know instinctively,
as he should do, when a project will prejudice his military plans ; it
is another matter for him amid stress of war to have to justify his
opinion. For instance, should proposals which would hamper
General Officer Commanding’s plans be propounded, General Officer
Commanding would then, in forwarding them, have to record for you
reasons for differing, and in order to do so intelligently at this
distance from England, much time and labour would be necessary,
possibly at a time of great pressure, and even then his points might
•not be made quite clear to thbse unfamiliar with existing local
military considerations. For these reasons I would submit very
earnestly for consideration that we should first concentrate our whole
energies on winning the war, and that future of this country which
. has already waited development so long will not be seriously
prejudiced even if certain steps on road of progress have to wait
another year.
“ I can assure His Majesty’s Government that I realise that it is not onlv
duty, but that it is my wish, to see that development of
civil administration of this country shall be pushed forward as far as
can conveniently be done without conflicting with military necessities
The many directions in which such development is taking place
already are best proof in support of this statement.” 9
9. Sir P. Cox’s comments on the proposals of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment were communicated in a telegram dated the 25th July 1917
(ho. 2768). He explained that the views expressed in his telegram of the
an April (see paragraph 2) were based on the experience of the preceding
two and a half years, but that the events of the past three months had caused
mm to modify his opinion to some extent for the following reasons :
“ Granted that vve are both imbued with the fullest desire to make good
ra n CeS wlnch we hpve given to Government, yet in practice many
difficult questions arise in regard to which there is room for
considerable divergence of view as to what is or is not in the interests
of Government or in harmony with spirit of their policy, and even in
our own particular sphere neither Army Commander nor I can lav